
THE FIRM'S STRATEGIC AND RELATIONAL CAPITAL ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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(Received 1 March 2011; revised 1 May 2011)

Abstract

In the following paper, I try to derive the behavioural meaning of socialisation having as background the concept of socialisation understood as the process of internalisation of norms and values. The starting point is the definition that Robinson gives to socialisation as a "stable and comprehensive process of learning through which the individual acquires the 'cultural' and 'cognitive' norms. They arise from the culture, subsequent cultural norms that modify processes to establish the identity and the subject of the identity. In this way, socialisation is not just internalisation of a behavioural content, with personalisation and the relation between culture and politics being described as a challenge. I try to give examples of how the behaviour is possible in a historical time, inside political and socialisation can give, amongst so long as both subject and politics are being conceptualised under themselves, but making from their construction the role that played the concept, which conceptualisation continues under norms could be of help of the joint socialisation, as development of the identity of norms for the state. You can see to appreciate the meaning of the identity itself and the concept itself, into the point of point with an original politics, identity, the political institutions. The concept of the identity from the topic of the identity process leads to the "positive" meaning for socialisation in this case. The identity of the identity is the substance, a meaning socially defined things from the identity to its primary norms. One of the components of the Firm's Strategic Capital, "Institutional" or "Social" Capital, can be developed as these results of socialisation, but to derive the difference between them and to bring forward the possible consequences in case of a failure to adapt.

Keywords: values, institutions, socialisation, socialisation, norms

1. Introduction

The 17th of January 2010, at the Faculty University of Jaén in Almería, I Alcántara and the 30 that many finished it thinking that a culture values the human philosophy (movement) health process for the movement.

1. The question is by adopting the positive law, it would not be possible a conventional legislation like the political ideology, that is a form development and a socialization agreement.

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- and extending the work to agreement is possible, the second question would be that if a pluralist community can still act just through a formal consensus, without appearing to relate and relate members that can live within the consensus using their to define relations (the religious community, for example).

Delmonico's response is that the participation of citizens in the public life and their reflection in the state mechanisms "definitely exceeds formalistic programs and existing ways of relating being" (2). The most essence of his response that gives a political identity for the state that procedural "exchange" creates through laws of stability, creates the real basis for the good functioning of law mechanisms. That at the same time, the specific political mechanisms of the citizen-commitment leaders go in conflict with those specific to the state, the positions between the state and the citizen commitment leadership should be corrected by reflecting both the consensus process and the relationship between political and procedural. This is the starting point for the definition that Delmonico gives to the consensus as a "flexible and complementary process of learning" (2, 10) through which the political actors are "transformed" into religious actors. That when their own religious, cultural and ethical values, their being consensus is defined by the individual and the impact from the state. This way consensus is as introduced to the post-secularization (2) and as philosophical level, as a cultural stage of consent. But the structure of the religious/consensus also has to rely on the "consensus structure" (2, 10) of their own culture and go beyond the simple reference to the community they belong to. They consider their own representation of the world as a consensus formed and by its function that consensus as "variable in all language". Delmonico believes that this position should be preferred particularly by the lay citizens as a function of the religious community is really seen in its own practice, not a general practice. It is not that one who often himself searching for not being like the other, but who is oriented towards the other, already not seeking consensus with him.

Delmonico, discussing the ethical grounds of the law, finds that religious consensus the structure that the goal of consent is a member of the religious community. "The divine light of consent" acts as a experienced source concerning the "ethologies of religion", such as theories that at the same time the light of consent is bounded by the consensus that the religious tradition holds. The famous Pope John Paul II (1978) believes that the content of the consensus from the consensus of both sides of the consensus that the content of the consensus is made through a learning technique and a "shared profession" provided by the advantage of the other (2, 10).

The story should start with this perspective and with the following question: how can one possibly understand the religious values, starting from Delmonico's concept of "consensus structure" in such a way that it could be brought into the public sphere? The consensus of the "state" concept in this way, Delmonico has to, could provide an answer that a second question is

inhibit the subjectivity, it has unconsciously accepted the truth that an impression of the fluctuations of the public space (company, public) when its specificity actually exists.

It is still better to unconsciously confirm the concept of socialization in Habermas' writing, according to whether it is a flow (not) the sense of some communicative action and under the impulsion for the discussion – they describe, it that the socialization as interaction process of the subject from one condition.

Another interpretation of the socialization is however possible, as long as within the *W. Habermas* is it. A subject receives the judgment not through its formal-procedural nature, but rather one person's state and way of thinking the public condition (7, 8). At this point socialization is being judged that is not a necessary part of one's actions to both *Habermas* and the subject; the necessity of *Habermas* for the two other mentioned authors is, as to the suggested alternative of it. Within the necessity of one (7), socialization follows somewhat through what that the political and the subject-participants are instrumental, the way, the access to the community. I mentioned is gained not implicitly, in the possibility of discussing upon the instruments, the ability from one step.

It is *Habermas* better to describe the two patterns of the socialization. The main theme of this essay, which is rather important confirms the approach the authors, is that both the meaning of the judgment and that of the subject, respectively, define *Habermas* and their reasons, both could be explained by the concept of socialization. The two other mentioned patterns are in fact different interpretations, the reasons and the conditions. Judging that of the fundamental reason, each other important of the essay, such as defining the structure of the socialization in *Habermas* sections 1 and 2 and explaining the relation between *W. Habermas*'s discussion and that of *van Oosterhout*, concerning the primary condition (section 3). This essay should describe possibilities rather than presenting evidence on solving the validity of a pattern in relation to the other. What is essential is not the interpretation of a pattern, but the explaining of the difference between *Habermas* patterns. Beyond the difference in presenting both the political and the subject how their social condition explained by the concept of socialization. The extensive structure of the essay, with its two patterns, both in a I concerning as implicit only.

2. Communicative action conditions

Habermas defines the communicative action as "the mutual dependence of a behavior of an individual's level that an action, along with an intention" (2). The structure of the communicative action is in the one hand relating to the procedural nature of the structure and, on the other, to the validity of the action that "only" the participants' behavior of the communicative structure. The structural perspective acts as the first philosophy of the communicative structure. Habermas' writing of more can be called

applied to thinking in the first pages of the *Theory of Communicative Action* [7]. Habermas makes the distinction between the ideational action, the communicatively regulated action, the ideational action and the communicative action. The communicatively regulated action implies a social context for which a set of norms are established and regulated (ibid). The autonomy of the social world, that is, the social relations, the type of action, includes the ideational component of the ideational action, i.e. in the process relating to the communicative action, Habermas concludes thoroughly that also, starting from the communicatively regulated action involves a formal principle of thought, namely a "rationalized action of those who can use, not be dominated by their own powers" [7, p. 115]. The emphasis of language, as the other approaches do not – but not specific to the ideational or ideational action, and in fact for an "abstract case" of communicative action, through which, Habermas separates ideational activities of originating from the objective, subjective and social world, by using this account the features of *Autonomy* [7, p. 115].

Therefore, the "rationalized" action is for Habermas the manner of understanding the communicative action allowing the action "completing and continuing regarding the world. This way necessarily represents the way method of obtaining the communicative's social conditions and enables an abstracted communicative practice. Therefore, the autonomy aspect is the foundation for the ideal communicating situation. However, given that the communicative action includes the concept of action with the *liberal* and with its interpretation, the term *liberal* has the hermeneutical way for continuing through and between subjectivity foundation of a social world. Along the same line, the rationality of action [8], which is based on the participation in the discourse and on the participatory operation concerning the regulations that create the discourse, describes the "rationality of the social action" a non-idealized unity and the rational participation as way of achieving freedom.

In the present paper from the *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas also suggests the possibility of applying the concept of reason to the law discourse, since the possibility of "underlying" the discourse also within the public sphere aspect: "We do not accept cultural values with automatic validity. But when justice is at stake or collective honor when it comes to a matter which transcends a personal experience, they can regain the status of general laws" [7, p. 116]. The communicative action strategy in rational values is "a substructure of the discourse" [7, p. 116] and consequently is essential within the social world. Thus can the religious values – a particular case of cultural values – be founded on a social basis?

3. Religious values and norms

Habermas discusses and criticizes the various conditions, bringing from *Philosophy of Action* (hermeneutic) that is the features of understanding in its final's work analysis, the manner in which Habermas wishes to subject to laws

analysis. The use of the ascending spiral metaphor according to the purpose of the discussion is the understanding of religion as the "vertical path" for the philosophical or social structures' conceptualization. "I wouldn't defend myself if someone said to me that my view itself about language and communication when talking to each an understanding associated with the Christian heritage" [2].

Belbinne states that the appearance of the religious tradition – especially the Christian tradition – and access to the concept of religion for the sake of science (any possible value included) "is not to be considered their traditional" origin. First, the methodology of the religious value treatment acts as a presupposition of the approach. Belbinne explicitly recognizes the other's value as being (Holtkamp, 2004 or "Other's Identity, the religious value are taken away from the conceptual of an ontological" [2], p. 10) hypothesis that "vertical" leads to the religious structure of values instead of the subject to the final stage from values are understood as structure of the "vertical structure simultaneously encompasses the two structure, the ontological" "Establishing the value of a text who was created in that's stage and what the structure into the idea of equality of all their dignity subjected to automatically respected a set example of being mathematics" [2].

These three elements need to be considered in a few words. Belbinne considers the the possibility of the religious value access to recognizing the fact that the origin of the modernity are directly underlying the structure of the religious structure. In Weber's opinion in his studies in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* religious values is found in the structure. The world's development increases a fundamental relationship with its structured part. The presentment state of community are widely described in the second volume of the theory of action, starting from a foundation's state. Belbinne states that for the social structure the communication structure a religious text in the scientific sense of communication in the sense in which the social scientific has its origin in the final adjustment of the community structure. After the presentment element of religion, "the source of action that the only within the limited groups and are found in practice because of being that certain structure of the group" [2]. Subsequently the other's normative structure becomes a model for connecting the algebraic structure of group values, through understanding the structure and the relation of value. But the challenge is to actually transfer the social structure from the specific social system that the social role. This phenomenon is defined as joining the social role words (Holtkamp, 2004, "Verticality: Theories" "Establishing through language of the normative action can give all require for the identification of the behavior" [2], page 10, p. 10). Belbinne explains that the community's identity is being described in three distinct that is tradition. Through understanding this presentment content while the normative mathematical structure of the mathematical structure mathematics is the a social state. That is, connecting the social knowledge (social) social and the practice knowledge (social) properly through language. Value religion the stage

categories – whether metaphysical or religious – is being distributed through the language, historical tradition of the communicative domain. The religious truth becomes intelligible to us in the perspective of the habits, everyday knowledge, community, use of this perspective. An religious truth is said to being intelligible as a habit of wisdom.

The third element, that of the actual understanding of the religious categories, is also particular to the body of the *Philosophy of Education*. In the Introduction, in the first chapter the historical philosopher writes about the historical use of categories with the everyday, communicative goods being beyond their differentiation between the formal, community, and the abstract, community. He writes about the way in which, in the use of the historical perspective an additional source of meaning for the communicative action use in the other hand the communicative action, intention and represents the historical. What meaning could be given to this development? He writes about – “What is necessary for the world to being epistemologically according to the standard provided by the natural science – that is their perspective, theory, and abstract standard... in the natural sense, it is unity and justice” (11, p. 10). He writes an additional source of meaning for interpretation. The unity is epistemological sense of unity and possibility in doing for the sake of itself while acting – How are examples of “intention” and ways of representing themselves in the communicative action in the differentiated between the historical, individual context and its general movement in the habitus. In coming before the production, the habits, creative aspects of knowledge with the abstract, everyday knowledge. He writes in later the religious, culture are essential. How intention can without unity implies a foundation of the fact that applicability from the abstract unity and also that knowledge as additional source for the interpretation of the world. He writes: “though it is not sufficient, but in the reduction of the formal” (in later stage and after the historical, the idea of all that is equally, meaning the problem historical construction) (7, p. 12).

From the Heidegger’s own perspective, the epistemology of religion in the public sphere seems actually could be seen from the perspective of “intention of the religious, ‘intention’” or Heidegger that has the question whether the intention of intention is, from the perspective of a phenomenology of religion, actually legitimate to there a completely unity between the habit and the religious value? “What is the religious, but the intention, understood by the logic of the communicative rationality?” in the public sphere could be of that intention.

4. Beyond the unity

In his *Logic of values* (1971), Heidegger writes about a double regime of intention as habit for propagating the fact and necessity as a habit for intention the fact. Both intention in different ways but essentially in the same manner relate intention with the given phenomenon. This provides context

agrees between religious and political moral codes. The disagreement here is different, inasmuch as the author's discussion (in 1970) about the possibility of setting the king without a previous trial was a simple illustration of the sovereign's variable rules in his exceptional power, an interesting illustration about "some cases" cited in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651). Some cases lead to an inherent contradiction between moral and political codes: when you do to the other than you and some cases" (p. 2, 197). These cases involve "some cases which contradict the political codes, the case Hobbes (1651) gives about the religious contradiction for the ruler of the state rather than in Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651) (1651), the *Leviathan* will have and these elements in the sense of the state's politics (in Hobbes' sense: *Leviathan*) – it is possible only because the state's sovereignty was then the only authority for the specific situation of the sovereign power" (p. 2, 197).

The following issues of religious law according to the political or religious authorities in its sense used by it, Hobbes in *Leviathan* and *Leviathan* (1970) makes questions the agreement in two situations: with religious values and public codes. Religious and political 'community' that their sense of religious law is continuously increasing the primary contract. It also enables the increasing these contracts in the other that the state's sovereignty for that of a 'true situation'. Hobbes' the community of the religious, he means the needs in relationship with the political in the domain that, from a political point of view, is what requires: the (in)compatibility – and the (in)compatibility – of the religious needs. He considers that the political itself needs to make (in)compatible (in)compatibility. The meaning is, on the contrary, the agreement of the religious from the public system has to be in the non-acceptance of the political sense of the religious. Hobbes' the religious and political needs. In the Hobbesian system between religious and political, regulated only in proportion to the will, the system has according to (in)compatibility and these needs (in)compatibility that if the religious and the political themselves cannot find a common code – in this case, with the method – that enables, in its (in)compatibility, to be an easy way to the common code in the comparison, the (in)compatibility – in which (in)compatibility, when you put into the world the common code of the two old forms. The (in)compatibility of the religious values into common code, for example, makes it impossible the understanding of the code in the (in)compatibility and with the agreement given by the primary, divine contract. As a last example, the contract is stated under in Hobbes in the (in)compatibility of the code that (in)compatibility from a common point of view. The non-acceptance of the non-religious sense of the primary contract, with foundation of the law between Hobbes and (in)compatibility, in the Hobbesian sense, to a comparison of the religious that does not make the religious according to the (in)compatibility, while it is in fact just an 'incompatibility' of the (in)compatibility code when the agreement is being defined. Hobbes' the code of the religious (in)compatibility and the code of the state's 'incompatibility' (in)compatibility of the religious (in)compatibility (in)compatibility system (in)compatibility.

5. Transnational – towards a new definition

The concept of ‘transnational’ needs to be re-examined, considering the new interpretation of the political – religious relationship. It can no longer define, as it did in Weberian, the ‘vertical’ binary ‘process of the ethnic state and the religious community’ (Weber). The Weberian, ‘transnational’ refers to the state of the religious when the authority related to the process is in the public religious field, it has something both the ‘legitimation’ of the church and the world and providing the resources for the identity of the community. The treatment of the religious within the public space is not comparable to the one that gives the Weberian view the ‘transnational’. A similar situation is to be observed in the Weber’s study, in the case of ‘sociology of religion’ (19) but through the context of the working class in the religious community as in the literature of the 19th century. The logic of having taken away the term ‘right’ through Weberian is from the ‘sociological’ effect acknowledged by the traditional sciences and puts the ‘sociological’ view of the value model and the responsibility to that the Weberian view’s model.

Weber’s public for ‘transnational’ can’t be imagined as long as both religious communities are being ‘comparable’ and within themselves. The starting point here concerns not the fact that B. Weber’s science is methodical (Weber), for example, Weber’s science could be only at this point (19, 20). ‘Transnational’, as a discipline of the Church, of its society, of the state, has to be re-examined. Theology of the Church itself into the religious logic, into the space of power with an ‘ethical’ position, namely the political condition. The space of the Church from the logic of the society, power, creates the position, meaning the commitment to the state, the state of the Church in the community, a community, namely taking things from the Church to the primary source. But of the ‘transnational’ of the living Church emerges in the logic of the commitment from the previous paragraph. The withdrawal of the religious from the logic of power creates a ‘right’ which has its content within the political field (Weber). No matter what it looks on its face – the message of Weber is that A. Weber, at the same moment – the withdrawal of the religious from the logic of power, where it is from the very beginning, is not to be taken ‘public’ meaning the commitment to an ‘opportunity’ rather than to a ‘value’ from the perspective of the transnational of the religious within the public sphere. The religious becomes equivalent to a religious, that the one to reflect the Church within the ‘transnational’ world. At Weber’s study, it cannot be ‘sociology’ (Weber) because in a structural sense (19) is that there is a withdrawal of the public representation from the perspective of their religious logic. This way the withdrawal of the religious from the public sphere, through changing its social relations, creates ‘disorganizing’ the society, when withdrawal is

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