
THE COMMUNIST CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF A POST-COMMUNIST GENERATION

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Abstract

Different studies on the Romanian tourism have demonstrated that the communist cultural heritage is only accidentally included as part of different national and regional tours. The Communism was publically condemned in Romania in 2006 under a real political and civic tension concerning its cultural patrimony. Lenin's statue is demolished in 1990, bones of the communist heroes are replaced in a mausoleum with the bones of World War II heroes, and a communist monument is downgraded from the list of Romanian historical monuments in 2004. Under these circumstances the present study is trying to see which is the attitude of a post-communist generation concerning the communist cultural heritage. Did the members of a generation born immediately after the fall of the Romanian communist regime (1989-1990) import the negative attitude concerning the communist cultural patrimony which is still publically shared by their parents' generation? This is the basic question we are trying to answer by an empirical research.

Keywords: communist patrimony, positive/negative attitude, communist cultural heritage, social representations, post-communist generation

1. Introduction

This paper aims to investigate the attitude of the post-communist generation towards the cultural heritage of Romanian communism, which in many public speech cases was the subject of a strong rejection during the last two decades. The public attitude towards this 'unwanted past' culminated in 2006 with the official condemnation of Communism by the President of Romania in the joint chambers of the Parliament. The event of condemning the Communism, but especially the noisy rejection of this public position by a part of the Romanian political scene, are elements that suggest a clear tension

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between different categories of population regarding the issue of the communist cultural heritage. The economic crisis situation of the recent years has given more credit to a positive social attitude about the perception of Communism in Romania, a fact which opinion polls have regularly confirmed it.

Our research interest is not focused on the members of a generation who received ideological education in the communist era. More specifically, we will try to see which is the perception of a certain generation, born, raised and educated in post-communist Romania, about the communist cultural heritage - monumental artwork, the approach in valuing it and its dedicated events etc., whose ideological significance with its obvious hermeneutical tension is representative for the generation educated before 1989.

When we speak about the *communist heritage*, we refer to a cultural legacy composed of tangible and intangible elements that have historical, cultural and social significance, that became and functioned as forms and aspects of legitimacy for the communist political power. Such a set of cultural elements is historically defined, has a clear ideological load, it focuses on urban areas in most cases and it is often correlated with propaganda mechanisms related to personality cult of communist leaders. The most important elements of such a cultural legacy are: (i) the high political charge it possesses for tourism (it might be used to praise or blame Communism as a political regime by political parties) and (ii) its controversial nature (acceptance or rejection of communist monuments, buildings and art as being part of nation's *heritage*) [1].

A definition applied to the communist patrimony as 'cultural heritage' can be also extracted from the generous definition proposed by UNESCO: "*The cultural heritage may be defined as the entire corpus of material signs - either artistic or symbolic - handed on by the past to each culture and, therefore, to the whole of humankind. As a constituent part of the affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities, as a legacy belonging to all humankind, the cultural heritage gives each particular place its recognizable features and is the storehouse of human experience. The preservation and the presentation of the cultural heritage are therefore a corner-stone of any cultural policy.*" [UNESCO, 25 C/4, 1989, p. 57

A very much applied definition of cultural heritage is proposed by D. Copot et al. when analysing the juridical dimension of the Romanian cultural and religious patrimony [2]. Thus, a cultural heritage is defined on five different axes: movable cultural heritage (goods identified as such and incorporating values, beliefs, knowledge, and traditional aspects), intangible cultural heritage (rituals, knowledge, artefacts and the appropriate skills and techniques), immovable cultural heritage (historic monuments, buildings), archaeological heritage (sites, movable objects and traces of human events together with the land where they were discovered), and museums and public collections.

The attitude toward the place which was supposed to occupy this 'cultural heritage as an entire corpus of material signs' artistic or symbolic that had given cultural identity to a whole political regime seem to have been a problem for all Central and Eastern Europe countries, since no one could answer in 1990 the

following question: Can the art and architecture of an oppressive regime, that seriously violated the rights and freedoms of citizens, become part of the national heritage?

2. Different answers to the same political question: what is to be done with the communist cultural legacy?

The historical experience has answered differently such a question in this central-eastern part of Europe. The communist cultural heritage, tangible and intangible, was equally accepted and rejected. Also, the debates on its condition and the public attitudes regarding it are far from being completed in some former communist countries, after more than two decades.

Thus, some part of the communist heritage was transformed in elements of contemporary history and it was also integrated in the special tourist circuits for foreigners and compatriots. We mention here the routes of the 'red tourism' in Poland (Krakow-Nowa Huta), Hungary (Szoborpark, Terror Haza), Czech Republic and Germany (Berlin - Wall and Checkpoint Charlie), along with other items of communist heritage such as Communist Crimes Museum (Museum STASI) in Berlin, Budapest Terror Haza, The Occupation Museum in Tallinn, The Occupation Museum in Riga or the Museum of Communism in Prague [3]. Without sharing the same characteristics of the Chinese phenomenon also known as 'red tourism' (educational role, aimed to stimulate a 'nostalgic attitude' in relation to the communist tradition, the defining of a positive-ideological communist tradition, the state involvement, etc.) the Eastern Europe red tourism is directly related to a general attitude of the public space in accordance with the ideological and cultural legacy of communism [3].

Other countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, had a different attitude towards the cultural heritage of Communism, the attitude created in the public space generating rather a current of rejection regarding the integration of the communist heritage in the cultural life of the City. In the Romanian case, the rejection of the communist cultural legacy can be proved, we think, remarking the absence of any tourist circuits dedicated to the communist cultural heritage. As D. Light has noted, the communist heritage in Romania could not become part of any national and international tourist routes, without being rather selective, under the conditions of rejecting the 'communist past' in the Romanian space [4].

Analyzing 'red tourism', Caraba shows that, from all the 39 tourist routes identified in Bucharest (Oct.-Dec., 2009), only one is focused on Communist targets, other containing only some communist objectives, of which the most common places are The House of Parliament, The Revolution Square, The Spark House (today, Free Press House), the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the balcony where Ceausescu has spoken publicly for the last time [3].

The analysts of the phenomenon of 'red tourism' show out that, at the limit, the extension of the deadline for other spaces than the Chinese one is difficult to accept, if there are taken into consideration the characteristics of state's involvement in the issue of red tourism. May be such an inappropriate extension would transform the concept into a kind of inadequate metaphor – part of a figurative language that instead of enhancing the message of the text and helping us getting a clearer image over the situation, creates rather confusion [5].

Taking into consideration the limits of using such a culturally defined concept, we stress upon the fact that the so called 'red tourism' is nonexistent for the Romanian case – a rejection attitude that seems unjustified for the private initiative of Romanian tourism. The early analysts of the phenomena regarding the rejection of the communist cultural and historical heritage in Romania, mentioned that, whatever we may speak about an interest for this touristic heritage, it is mostly related to those touristic routes for foreign tourists that wanted to see, in the first few months of 1990, shortly after the fall of the regime in Bucharest, the new atmosphere in an ex-communist Capital, the early scene of a bloody revolution. In particular, Light considers that in Romania there is a specific situation of a kind of 'unwanted past'. So, the perception of the foreign tourists about the Romanian communist heritage is, paradoxically, offset by an attitude of rejection within the country, particularly in Bucharest, where he considered there was a real attempt to reject the communist regime and to deny this 'red' temporal sequence out in the history of Romania [4].

3. Communist art – an artistic heritage in the social representations of a population

The psychological universe is not objective and it's composed of subjective worlds that interacts, adjusts and influence each other according with the social relations and cultural patterns of the entire system of collective norms and values which represent the elements that give internal consistency of these universes. This picture about the actual facts, the manner in which we interpret and perceive everyday reality, this form of social consciousness has been called **social representation**. It is the foundation of behavioural and attitudinal reactions of the individual.

The concept of social representation has a history as long as that of the Sociology, being introduced by Durkheim in 1898 in the work *Following E. Durkheim* (Representasion individuelles et representations collectives). Collective representations constitute a general class of intellectual and social productions, which encompass all the references of Science, ideology, myth, etc. They are social to the extent that express common characteristics of a group or society, and are psychological because the perception of reality and thought organization are individual processes [6-8].

More than any other political ideologies, communism was focused on propaganda, at the discourse or imagery level, namely on the manipulation of social representations. Being a revolutionary ideology, at least initially,

communism was very open to explore new limits and challenges, being ruthless with anything that appeared conservative, i.e. bourgeois. So, although communism has shocked in the beginning all the shared social representations, generating confusion and fear because of the symbolic reconstruction of society by introducing a secular religion (communism) instead of the soteriological one, it managed in several generations to build new social representations, with new terminologies and symbols.




Figure 1. (a) Statue of Independence, Iasi, Romania; (b) The Statue of Republic's Council, Budapest, Hungary.

3.1. A cultural heritage with ideological message

The two images from Figure 1 - one from Romania and one from Hungary - have completely different topics. In Figure 1a is the Statue of Independence (Iasi, sculptor Gabriela Adoc, 1977) and in Figure 1b is the Communist Statue – The Statue of Republic's Council - (Budapest, Istvan Kiss 1969). But essentially the feathered style, using a banner as an element of cohesion, the hands expression (call and embrace) the two works belong to the same artistic style - a kind of postproletcultism – or, more accurately, the very genuine artistic style of Communism.

For the residents of the communist states, such statues represented over time something very familiar, a meeting place, their social space representations being internalized beyond any ideological dimension. Thus, they remained unaltered in the collective memory after the end of Communism, representing the foundation of a certain type of social aesthetics.

Although there were not expressed every time, the attitudes and the social representations on which the communist art seeks to rely are found in the meanings given by the very nature of those symbols. Internalized through long educational processes, these symbols are recognized by any member of a generation who was educated in the Romanian communist system, irrespective of the attitude of rejection/acceptance which it can cause. They are part of a collective consciousness in which the individual inevitably participates in the ideological environment, placed on a true 'mass consciousness' in the sense of a stable aggregate of images founded on life experiences and different sources of information that generate a network of social stereotypes which determine the meanings by which we perceive real objects, relationships, events and personal performances through [9].

Returning to the basic research question of the study: Do we find this tension of acceptance/rejection, about the cultural heritage with strong ideological impact, in the case of the post-communist generation?

4. Applied research - objectives, methodology, results

4.1. The objectives of the research

The principal objective of this research is to see how a post-communist generation – born and educated after the fall of the communist regime – relates to the cultural heritage of the communist regime. In other words, young people, born after 1990, do participate to the tension present in the Romanian public space (media), maintained of those who support/reject the conservation and the use of cultural communist symbols? How this generation, uncontaminated with the communist ideology, would interpret the fact that a monument dedicated to communist heroes was downgraded from the category of historical monuments?

Based on these research questions, our study aims: (i) to identify the attitudes towards the communist heritage, (ii) measuring the attitudes of some representatives of the post-communist generation regarding the monuments and the statuary assemblies constructed in the time of communism, along with their associated events.

Under these two objectives we tried to introduce a variable related to social influence generated by an authority situation. More specifically, in each of the universities in which we conducted the research we tried to maximize the credibility of the source, following the idea which assumes that the credibility of the source affects the degree of confidence between the communicator and recipient, it significantly influence how the recipient perceives information and reacts to the words, ideas, actions of the communicator [9, p. 407].

In the experiment, the main role was played by a teacher who taught directly to groups which included students participating in the experiment. Our assumption was that such an 'internal' model of authority had a higher chance of credibility in order to trigger possible positive or negative clichés (rejection) assimilated by students after the exposure to different forms of communication and socialization - family, friends, colleagues, courses and seminars, Romanian media, etc.

Starting from such an hypothesis, inside such an experimental situation, our research proposes to test if a particular type of discourse associated to the communist heritage can influence (positive or negative) the group's perceptions toward the monuments built during Communism. In other words, we tried to activate two possible 'frames of reference' by the 'principle of least effort' explained by M. Solik when analyzing the relevance of message perception in mass media communication [10]. The two 'frames of reference' represent the parts of the interpretative tension on the communist legacy which co-exist in the Romanian public space after the fall of the communist regime. Could they be activated by the sources of authority involved in our research in three different Romanian universities?

4.2. Experimental groups

The attitude towards the communist heritage was measured by applying questionnaires on 3 experimental groups of students, as follows:

- (i) **The control group** - the questionnaire was given to students in order to complete it without any influence from the teacher.
- (ii) **The positively influenced group** - this group was formed using students whose teacher tried to induce a positive attitude towards the communist heritage, using the legitimate source of his authority. Also, the influence of their attitude was created using a preamble of 8 influence-questions specially built besides the initial questionnaire;
- (iii) **The group negatively affected** - in this group, the teacher tried to induce a negative attitude towards the communist heritage, through the presentation

speech about the questionnaire, accentuated also by 8 additional questions that preceded the questionnaire.

The students were selected from two university centres, Bucharest and Iasi, and three universities: National University for Political Studies and Public Administration and ‘Nicolae Titulescu’ University (Bucharest) and ‘Gheorghe Asachi’ Technical University (Iasi). The research tried to identify:

- (a) The changes in attitudes between the three groups – the control group, the positive and negative influence groups - within each university;
- (b) The changes in attitudes between the control groups consisting of three different groups of students from three different universities and specializations.

Basically, through this segment of the study, we test whether a particular institutional context and profile of the respondent lead to different attitudes towards the communist heritage. Our assumption was that, especially at a socio-political profile, where students have consistent contact with the communist ideology and doctrine, the communist regime, ideas about the communist holocaust, international politics from a historical perspective, in particular, related to the Soviet Union, etc., there is more probably to identify and/or to generate a rejection attitude towards the communist cultural legacy using stereotypes and negative information.

4.3. The structure of the questionnaires

The questionnaires which were used for the three groups had a common part of 17 questions on which this analysis is being based. The 8 targeting questions for a positive/negative attitude toward the communist heritage had the function of strengthen the source of authority represented by the experimenter-teacher, who spoke to students from the two groups about negative actions against the communist legacy, or also about positive actions toward communist heritage in different countries. In the case of the control group, subjects were only asked to complete a questionnaire, without adding anything related to teacher’s contribution. Subjects were asked to complete the questionnaire in accordance with the expression of their attitude towards the described action rather than the historical reality, their attitude being measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘strongly agree’ and 5 means ‘strongly disagree’.

The 17 commune items of the questionnaire, as they were presented for all groups, are:

- **Q1.** *Romanian politicians want to liquidate the legacy of communist symbolism present in monuments, statues, buildings, etc. with the scope to eliminate forever the memory of this bloody regime.*
- **Q2.** *The demolition of the symbols of the ‘old system’ is not a new practice in history: in the late ‘40s the communist regime proceeded to remove capitalist symbols – e.g. the monuments of interwar personalities, Communist leaders having a propensity for removing the statues of the kings.*

- **Q3.** *Depending on the different stages of the regime, some figures of the communist leaders were removed from the socle. Statue of Petru Groza, for example, reached Mogoșoaia in 1953, soon after Stalin's death.*
- **Q4.** *In Bucharest, the statue of Lenin has morphed into 'I.L. Caragiale', Lenin's head being replaced with that of the playwright.*
- **Q5.** *In Iasi, the monument of the Soviet soldier was melted and turned into the 'Horse of Michael the Brave'.*
- **Q6.** *The monument of heroes fight for freedom of the people and the homeland, for socialism - created by Romanian communists in 1960 and exhibited in Carol Park was saved from demolition by renaming it 'Heroes Memorial'.*
- **Q7.** *The church 'Exaltation of the Holy Cross' in Oradea has a foundation built with materials from former communist monuments in the centre of Oradea.*
- **Q8.** *In Braila, on the Danube promenade, is a building on which you can read huge metal letters 'the people', the original inscription being 'Ceausescu and the people'. The letters that formed the first word were removed in 1990.*
- **Q9.** *In 1990, angry groups of people destroyed the statue of Lenin from the Spark's Square, then called the Free Press Square.*
- **Q10.** *After demolishing the statue of Lenin in Square Free Press, in 1990 there were proposed a series of projects to cover the empty space thus created – e.g. - placing in the area a statue of Mihai Eminescu.*
- **Q11.** *Starting with the year 2000, on the pedestal of the statue of Lenin left blank in the Free Press Square are now placed Romanian and European Union intersected flags, reflecting 'the intersection of Europe'.*
- **Q12.** *In 2003, instead of Lenin's statue at the Free Press Square, it was decided that a metal sphere, with a diameter of ten meters, should be placed there suggesting the ball with letters and graphic signs of a typewrite, representing the freedom of expression of journalists and writers, gained after 1989.*
- **Q13.** *Another option taken into account for displaying a monument instead of Lenin's statue in the place of Free Press Square was the statue of Rizea Elizabeth from the peasant village of Nucșoara, a symbol of anti-communist opposition.*
- **Q14.** *The project currently rumoured to be set in the place of Lenin's statue it is represented by three stylized wings, made of stainless steel, plated with bronze patina.*
- **Q15.** *In 1963 was inaugurated the monument heroes fight for freedom of the people and the homeland, for socialism which consists of a circular base plated with black granite on which are located five slender arches covered with red granite. Base contains an internal circular enclosure (rotonda), lined with red granite slabs, whose dome is decorated with golden mosaic. The rotonda included the crypts of the communists leaders,*

Petru Groza, Gheorghiu-Dej and C.I. Parhon, and around there were crypts of other communists such as Stefan Gheorghiu, I.C. Frimu, Leontin Sălăjan, Alexander Moghioroș, Patrascanu, Grigore Preoteasa, Ilie Pintilie, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, etc. In 1991 the mausoleum was dismantled, bones were exhumed and were moved to cemeteries.

- **Q16.** *Instead of the bones exhumed from the communist mausoleum, there were brought the relics of the soldiers who died in World War II, from the Marasesti Mausoleum. The mausoleum and the Communist monument in front were dedicated in the honour of the Unknown Soldier memory.*
- **Q17.** *The communist monument in the Carol Park was downgraded in 2004 from the list of historical monuments because he is a symbol of the painful memory of communist nomenclature.*

4.4. The scale attitude towards communist heritage: analysis of internal consistency

In order to verify the used items and for the performing of the subsequent statistical processing, we constructed a new variable, which is an unique score for respondents's attitudes towards the communist heritage, cumulating the answers to the 17 questions applied to each one of the 3 experimental groups. But before the mere sum of scores, we realised **the consistency analysis of items**, assuring us that the items used in the questionnaire are 'one-dimensional', i.e. measure the same characteristic, psychological reality [11], in this case the attitude towards the communist heritage.

Thus, we turned to calculating *Cronbach α* coefficient in SPSS, obtaining the following values for the scale of 17 items (Tables 1 and 2).

We first note that, using all 17 items, the value of the Cronbach α coefficient is 0.813, so the above generally accepted threshold of 0.70. Also, if we look in the third column of the table, we see that by removing items Q2 and Q6, we get a very slight increase of the Cronbach coefficient α , thus reaching values of 0.815, 0.817 respectively. Given, however, that these increases are insignificant, we opted to keep the scale of all 17 items.

Once we made sure that this is possible, we created a new variable that contains the average scores of the 17 items for each respondent. The average scores obtained were then incorporated by recoding into three categories: 1 = *Agree*, 2 = *Neither agree nor disagree*, 3 = *Disagree*, corresponding to negative attitudes, neutral, or positive towards communist heritage. Therefore, in presenting averages for different groups, we have scores ranging from 1 to 3, where **1 means a negative attitude** towards the communist heritage and **3 corresponds to a positive attitude**.

In the newly created variable recoding was kept equal distance of response options and thereby preserving the character of the variable interval, needed to carry out the analysis of variance (ANOVA). For the 1 value there were included the answers settled in the range of [1; 2.33], for the 2 value there were included the answers settled in the range of [2.34; 3.66], and for the 3 value

there were included the answers settled in the range of [3.67; 5]. The thus created variable is in fact a global indicator of attitudes towards the communist heritage for each student interviewed.

Table 1. Reliability statistics.

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0.813	0.815	17

Table 2. Cronbach's Alpha coefficient in two different situations.

Item	The correlation with the total score	The value of Cronbach α if the item is eliminated
Q1	0.414	0.804
Q2	0.235	0.815
Q3	0.389	0.805
Q4	0.424	0.803
Q5	0.459	0.801
Q6	0.183	0.817
Q7	0.380	0.806
Q8	0.447	0.802
Q9	0.498	0.798
Q10	0.456	0.801
Q11	0.489	0.799
Q12	0.445	0.802
Q13	0.392	0.805
Q14	0.398	0.805
Q15	0.514	0.797
Q16	0.461	0.800
Q17	0.342	0.808

4.5. The influence of institutional factors

One of the objectives of the research involved testing the existence of statistically significant differences in the attitudes towards communist heritage given by the educational institution and specialization followed by the respondent. In this regard were compared the results obtained from the application of questionnaires in 3 control groups of 3 different higher education institutions: National School of Political and Administrative Studies - **Faculty of Political Sciences**; 'Nicolae Titulescu' University - **Faculty of Law**; 'Gheorghe Asachi' Technical University - **Faculty of Chemical Engineering, Environmental Protection Specialization**.

Beyond the simple direct differences between the three average results (Figure 2), we can test through a more rigorous method if between the 3 samples of students are statistically significant differences. For this purpose we will use ANOVA (analysis of variance) to test the dispersion degree of the averages results for more than two distinct groups/samples, as in this case.




Figure 2. The scores as averages obtained in the control groups.

The result for the ANOVA test is $F = 3.285$, for a threshold, $p = 0.041$. Obtaining a significant level for the F test ($p < 0.05$) and ensuring the variance's homogeneity (Levene test $p = 0.793$) for **comparing averages of three groups taken two by two**, we will read *Bonferroni* test values.

In interpreting ANOVA test, we were not interested about the intrinsically result (the F value) or of the size of differences between the means of two groups, but of the statistical significance between the two groups at the mean differences (in other words, we want to see if the means of the two groups differ significantly, regardless of the size of these differences). In order to move at the comparing two by two of the average values, we should first test the homogeneity of the variance. This is done by Levene test. A threshold $p > 0.05$ for the Levene test indicates the homogeneity of the variance and requires the use of Bonferroni test for the media comparison in pairs in our analysis. In the present research, all ANOVA tests, Levene's test had a $p > 0.05$, which means that we used Bonferroni test for each of them.

Table 3. Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni test). Dependent variable: the scale attitude towards the communist heritage – recoded.

Specialization (I)	Specialization (J)	Differences between means (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Political sciences	Chemistry	-0.05667	0.14861	1.000
	Law	0.34333	0.14861	0.068
Chemistry	Political sciences	0.05667	0.14861	1.000
	Law	0.40000	0.17658	0.077
Law	Political sciences	-0.34333	0.14861	0.068
	Chemistry	-0.40000	0.17658	0.077

As can be seen from the last column of Table 3, for none of the three pairs of specialization we didn't manage to obtain a statistically significant threshold ($p > 0.05$ in all three cases). This leads us to conclude that the **institutional**

factor given by the university and by specialization followed by the students, does **not significantly affect their attitudes towards the communist heritage**.

4.6. The attitudinal variance towards the communist heritage: Bucharest

Using as **independent variable** the attitude towards the communist heritage induced by professor in each of the three experimental groups, and as **dependent variable**, the attitude scale towards the communist heritage mentioned earlier, this time we propose to test the **hypothesis** according to which **the attitude of the teacher in the speech presentation of the questionnaire affects in a significant way and in the same direction the respondents attitude towards communist heritage**. In other words, we expect that students from the positively influenced group to show greater positive attitudes than the control group, while students from the negatively affected group will show positive attitudes to a lesser extent than the control group.




Figure 3. Only the positive influence generated real results concerning the group attitude on the communist cultural heritage.




Figure 4. The subjects who were influenced negatively seem to be less favourable towards the communist cultural heritage.

As we can see from the graph in Figure 3, our hypothesis seems to support only the case of the positively influenced group (the mean of 2.03 was higher than the control group average of 1.68). The same thing we can deduce through an analysis of variance (ANOVA), by achieving a statistically significant

difference between the average of the positive influenced group and the average of the control group, as can be seen in Table 4. Surrounded score ($p = 0.036$) indicates a significant ($p < 0.05$) of the difference between the two mentioned groups.

Table 4. Multiple comparisons for Bucharest students (Bonferroni test). Dependent variable: the scale attitude towards the communist heritage – recoded.

Experimental group (I)	Experimental group (J)	Differences between means (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Control group	Positive attitude	-0.35468*	0.13928	0.036
	Negative attitude	-0.03193	0.15364	1.000
Positive attitude	Control group	0.35468*	0.13928	0.036
	Negative attitude	0.32275	0.18344	0.243
Negative attitude	Control group	0.03193	0.15364	1.000
	Positive attitude	-0.32275	0.18344	0.243

Note: *The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 threshold.

Table 5. Multiple comparisons for Iasi students (Bonferroni test). Dependent variable: the scale attitude towards the communist heritage – recoded.

Experimental group (I)	Experimental group (J)	Differences between means (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Control group	Positive attitude	0.00667	0.16959	1.000
	Negative attitude	0.38167	0.16959	0.083
Positive attitude	Control group	-0.00667	0.16959	1.000
	Negative attitude	0.37500	0.17131	0.096
Negative attitude	Control group	-0.38167	0.16959	0.083
	Positive attitude	-0.37500	0.17131	0.096

4.7. The attitudinal variance towards the communist heritage: Bucharest-Iași

As in the previous case, the questionnaires applied to three groups of students in Iasi have tested the hypothesis according to which the induced attitude about communist heritage by the teacher has influenced the respondents answers in the questionnaires. Again, the simple visualization of the averages (Figure 4) suggests that one part of the hypothesis is confirmed, namely that

subjects that were influenced negatively manifest a lesser extent favourable opinion towards communist heritage than subjects in the control group.

But if we make an analysis of variance in SPSS, we see that the difference between the two averages is not statistically significant ($p = 0.083$) (Table 5). This result leads us to conclude that, in this case, the attitude induced to the subjects does not significantly influence the behaviour towards communist heritage measured through questionnaires.

5. Conclusions: is the Romanian communist cultural legacy a forever ,unwanted past'?

5.1. Students resistance to negative information about communist heritage

For students in Political science from Bucharest, it has been recorded a significant influence of the teacher in the group directed to a positive attitude towards the communist heritage. The positive message about the communist heritage as cultural-historical heritage, the information about the integration of the communist monuments in the tourist routes in other former communist countries and the use of this heritage as source of income in post-communism have led to a growing positive attitude towards the Romanian communist heritage. We can not explain why the same experimenter, who obtained positive attitudes towards the communist heritage has failed in guiding a negative attitude, prepared for the special designed group, towards communist heritage. We believe that the assumption of resistance (closing) of the group concerning the message of rejecting the historic value of the communist heritage is at least as justified as any other hypothesis about the limits of research. Not being actors directly involved in the public tensions on the communist cultural legacy and not having any negative social representations about the communist regime, the post-communist representatives of the younger generation do not consider that its cultural heritage should be rejected from the cultural-historical heritage of the country.

In the second case, viewing the average values of the 3 groups from the Technical University Gheorghe Asachi (Iasi), suggests that the teacher has managed to influence the group in which he suggested negative images and ideas about Communism and the communist heritage value. In the terms of this study, it is apparent that the subjects which were negatively influenced by the experimenter's message and by the directed questions of the questionnaire show a lesser extent favourable opinion towards the communist heritage than subjects in the control group. Through the analysis of variance we see that the difference between the two averages is not statistically significant ($p = 0.083$). This result leads us to conclude that in this case, subjects induced behaviour does not significantly influence the attitude towards communist heritage measured through questionnaires.

The third significant result of the study is related to the attitude of the control groups about the communist cultural heritage. As it was already been noted, the averages obtained from the 3 control groups of the 3 universities do not differ significantly. In conclusion, the attitude toward the cultural communist heritage is not influenced by any institutional factor (e.g. university, specialization of students). Our assumption was rather that the students from Political science will have a lower acceptance attitude than students from other specializations (Chemistry, Law). Taking into account the assumed research limits, we mention that the experimenter-teacher has managed, rather, to rise a more acceptance attitude toward communist heritage, in the group with a positive message about the communist heritage. The negative message about the communist heritage of the same experimenter did not influence the other group attitude yet.

5.2. The limits of the research

This research and its findings should not be understood otherwise than at the standard limits of the experimental research method. This means that we don't suggest axiomatically-true conclusions. The logic of this type of research is radically different from that of a representative sample, for example, in the case of an opinion survey. Along with the specific limits of the research method, we add the possible distortion factors specific to any research data, such as the existence of three teachers who apply questionnaires and try to generate positive/negative attitudes in their groups. Also, the number of subjects who participated in the experiment, and the lack of other studies of the same type, are all limitations of our research. Other research on the same topic of this study should be undertaken in order to fulfil the necessity of comparing the present results.

5.3. Final conclusion

In the research context described above, we consider that from this study should be noted that there is a high probability that the post-communist generation of the countries that had an attitude of rejection towards the communist legacy (Romania, Bulgaria, for example) do not participate at the social tensions of the previous generation on the issue of conservation/renouncing at the communist cultural heritage. It seems that the new generation does not have any meaningful ideological rejection of the cultural heritage. The 'unwanted past' that Light [3] was talking about in the 'red tourism' analysis in Romania a little more than a decade ago seems to have become in the meantime a 'normal' historical past, with a cultural heritage considered as having the same dignity with Romanian cultural heritage of any other historical eras. A post-communist generation seems to be ready to drop out the ideological dimension of a communist cultural legacy which had definitely marked the interpretation of the previous generations. In the end it seems the

first post-communist generation in Romania has not inherited the social tension concerning the communist cultural legacy of the previous generation.

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