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# TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT IN THE EPOCH OF THE INCREASE OF HEURISTIC SENSE OF THE 'COMPLEMENTARITY' IDEA

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## **Abstract**

In the given article we study the notion of 'transcendental subject' in connection with the problem of forming the idea of 'complementarity' in culture and society. The modern epoch brought about such changes in the social and spiritual structure of society that lead to the increase of subjectivity. And this, in its turn, splits the 'subject' itself, causing 'spotty consciousness' of the individual. The human being as a harmonic 'ensemble' of many '-selves' finds himself as a 'split' subject, in whom, sometimes chaotically, the 'worlds' and 'pictures of the world' exist as distanced and disconnected unities.

The modern person, ceasing to perceive himself as a 'complete personality, starts to refer himself to the simple set of '-selves', corresponding to different spiritual and cultural situations. From this point of view, the personal orientation of man and society to the idea of 'complementarity' enables them to overcome the existing 'spotty consciousness', arising as a result of the increasing 'split' between existence and consciousness.

*Keywords:* modern epoch, functional, space, transcendental subject

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## **1. Introduction**

The investigation of the 'transcendental subject' and its functional space is connected with the idea of complementarity, which remains the subject of interminable discussions.

The authors, studying the heuristic potential of the idea of 'complementarity', aim at exposing the multilevel character of the central notion of the 'transcendental subject', which apart from philosophical and specifically scientific levels incorporates the level of concrete methodological decisions.

The idea of 'complementarity' is connected with the stock revision of the causal analysis of phenomena. Due to this, the notion of 'transcendental subject' enables us to expose new experimental facts, not found within the limits of causal description of phenomena. In this respect the idea of 'complementarity',

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which represents some generalization of the causality ideal, is included into a wide world outlook context, connected with the summarizing of classical conceptions.

The heuristic potential of the idea of ‘complementarity’ is expressed in the fact that this idea presupposes cognition, exercised in concrete socio-cultural conditions.

In this respect the idea of ‘complementarity’ claims harmonic and complete covering of the whole knowledge, whose structure is connected with the significant circumstance, when the knowledge has already been received by the person.

The idea of ‘complementarity’ overcomes the fragmentary character of human knowledge. Any objects of knowledge, from this point of view, become complementary to each other.

## **2. Method**

As a methodological base of the research of ‘transcendental subject’ there comes the principle of ‘complementarity’, enabling us to harmonize different ‘-selves’ in the person himself, which forms the foundation for the dialogue and mutual understanding among peoples and cultures.

There are many ‘-selves’ in the person, for example, empirical, theoretical, transcendental, absolute, etc. The mosaic character of the individual consciousness, required by the modern social reality, often results in the absence of complete self-perception of the person. At the same time, human consciousness acquires fractured, file character. It switches on to the ‘pitch’, providing the given situation with the activity of many ‘-selves’, incorporated into its unity. Mosaic worlds of many ‘-selves’ form the feedback genetic relations, complementary to each other.

## **3. The main part**

Reflecting on the essence of the ‘transcendental subject’, we can notice that this subject is not only the ‘gnoseological’ one, denoting the regulative principle, ranging the forms of mental activity, but a more complex subject, making the very consciousness of the man ‘mosaic’.

The ‘transcendental subject’ is the subject independent of the wishes; it is not some ‘spotty’ and ‘fragmentary’ consciousness, but ‘thinking’, i.e. ‘pure consciousness’, relieved from any self-will and subjectivity. It is this given fact that enhances the importance of the dialogue among the ‘parts’ of the ‘split’, ‘fragmentary’ consciousness and, finally, the very idea of ‘united’ completeness of the subject and the unity of its consciousness. Notice that the absence of the idea of complete ‘-self’ is the foundation for postmodernist discourses about ‘the death of the subject’, ‘the death of the person’.

The subject as an overcoming of the ‘split’ consciousness is, in our opinion, in the ways of development of transcendental philosophy, which appeals to the principle of ‘-self’, detailed in the ‘science doctrines’ of I.G. Fichte, especially in the ‘science doctrine’ of 1804. So, G. Girndt notes that the person holding the opinion of ‘transcendental idealism’ is neither in the ‘Absolute’, nor in the ‘factual phenomenological existence’, as the dogmatic idealism tends to be, but in the ‘focal point of both’ [1]. Because to exist means ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ in ‘existence here’. The very transcendental reflection over the universals of culture (freedom, love, etc.) is such an action, by means of which we differentiate the cognitive abilities of the person, and at the same time the very transcendental ability of the person does not relate either to the objects of ‘contemplation’, or to the objects of thought, but only to the subjective abilities of the person. This ‘spirit’ may be possibly characterized as a complementary ‘spirit’, penetrating the mind from the modern Quantum physics. The mental notions arise as a result of the ‘pure’ notions, applied only to human ‘sensuousness’, on the whole, referring to ‘things by themselves’, citing Kant’s term.

### ***3.1. The idea of ‘complementarity’ and the ‘transcendental subject’***

The idea of ‘complementarity’ having historical-philosophical analogies, enables us to think otherwise of the very ‘transcendental subject’ as not only a ‘gnoseological’ one, but having rich contents, expressed in its communicative and existential space of vision.

N. Bohr thinks that the complementary way of phenomena description is a means for solving epistemological problems, arising as a result of differentiating of the subject and object. Due to this, the very complementarity of each separate part of existence, in each separate ‘-self’ does not exclude to the most or to the least degree, any other one [2]. Neither the ‘transcendental’, nor the ‘absolute’ or ‘spiritual’ can be regarded as something self-contained, determining the ‘threads’ of cultural synthesis.

Thus, Weizsacker, exposing the affinity between the ‘dual status of the ‘complete’ (as it is complete, it does not exist; because it exists, it is multiple) and the ‘idea of complementarity’, and develops the idea, according to which ‘any property of the object becomes visible only due to the fact that the object loses this property’ [3]. When the ‘absolute’ is excluded from the process of the object cognition, it is represented most conspicuously. In this respect, the person nowadays loses the very ability to observe the world and experiences by virtue of this spiritual and moral disquietude.

### ***3.2. The idea of spiritual disquietude***

The topic of spiritual ‘disquietude’ remains practically closed for rationalists (for example, for R. Descartes, V. Leibnitz et al). The rationalists, in principle, deal with ‘pure’ thinking, while spiritual ‘disquietude’, the person’s

worry over the dominance of strictly pragmatic values turns very often into the overcoming of the stable condition of the person's mental and spiritual worlds. Indeed, the 'mental' and the 'spiritual' worlds of the person are complementary to each other. This very moment increases the degree of the person's relation to human values.

Far back N. Bohr tried to see the efforts of the person as expressing the 'complementary relations' in the sphere of 'mental' psychological phenomena. But with time N. Bohr refused this interpretation, which probably "does not take place in the real respect of complementarity" [4]. If we regard the idea of 'complementarity' from the point of view of the 'transcendental subject', then, surely, neither the 'corporal –self', nor the 'mental –self' will succumb to the spirit of 'mutual determination'. The idea of the 'transcendental subject' as a more complex subject than the purely gnoseological one does not just differentiate the 'mental' and the 'corporal' beginnings in the person and in the culture, but aims at the very subject to search such 'primary elements' in the genesis and cognition, where the distance between the 'soul' and the 'body' is incomparable to the distance between 'love' and 'spirit'.

### ***3.3. The main insight of the 'transcendental subject'***

This insight is all the more remarkable that it is possible to trace some affinity of N. Bohr and I. Kant's positions [5]. According to N. Bohr the 'things' are not 'beyond' the phenomena, but 'inside' them. So, here we have a properly Kant's view on the object as a condition for the 'possibility of experience' [6].

### ***3.4. The systemic crisis of the spirit, culture and morals***

Nowadays in the conditions, when we observe the systemic crisis of culture, philosophy, spirit and morals, the very subject, so to speak, splits into parts. Neither the 'absolute -self', nor the '-self', expressing the principle of the person's enjoyment with the formed relations, can express the formation of the inner sense of the object. The very 'feeling' often gets connected with the symbolic, 'virtual' object. Both the 'soul' and the 'body', and the 'spiritual' world of the person characterize in the present existence not themselves, but only the far 'past'. The very past turns out as represented in the present only halfway, it becomes some fragment of 'itself'. Hence, we see that it is difficult, probably, to become the past. The 'fragmentary character' of existence means incompatibility among different '-selves' in the person, and that is why any spiritual, cultural event often becomes akin to the 'frozen present', i.e. the present without movement and development.

### ***3.5. The transcendental subject and the epoch of globalization***

In the epoch of globalization the mankind acutely experiences the 'fragmentary character' of existence, the absence of the very process of

‘constituting’ the subject which ‘sparkles’, constantly changing its ‘masks’ and types of activity. At present the person tries to stay within the limits of two modifications of his subjectivity – the ‘existence-in-the-world’ and ‘cogito’. The person becomes, so to speak, ‘sparkling’ on the boundary of the two dispersing worlds – the spiritual and the material.

From this point of view, the ‘transcendental subject’ harmonizes different ‘-selves’ in the person on the verge of the phenomenal and the noumenal (spiritual) worlds, thus keeping the person as really existent in the world.

### ***3.6. The transcendental subject and the idea of complementarity***

The ‘transcendental subject’ in the epoch of the increase of the heuristic sense of the ‘complementarity’ idea does not topple into the outer sense, i.e. it does not dissolve in the world of things and is not neutralized by some outer and inner phenomena. ‘The transcendental subject’, taken in its ‘absolute essence’, is mainly, the very problem of language, for example, in Fichte [7]. The latter, as is known, turning to the idea of investigation of ‘the last foundation’ of the nation, noted that though we are excited with ‘things’, processes, and the ‘language’ is a means of spiritual resurrection, the very duality of the ‘soul’ and the ‘body’ is overcome in the idea of the ‘final’ foundation of the national and cultural life. The given ‘foundation’, as is known, represents the ‘spiritual constitution’ of the special life of a people, of its ‘transcendental freedom’ [8]. That is why the ‘sparkling’ consciousness of the subject is overcome with the increase of complementary thinking in culture, which is topical in the modern epoch, the epoch of formation of the alive, i.e. life-capable personified cogito, that is, finally, the formation of thought as a global planetary activity.

The ‘sparkling consciousness’ of the subject teaches us to reflect, to think today. The thought is in motion, if it pulsates in each present moment. This is precisely what urges the very ability of the person to overcome something ‘dark’ to motion, which is characteristic of the present, worried by the outright ‘exist here’. Otherwise, the inner world of the subject heads to something dark and vacant [9].

### ***3.7. The heuristically creative character of ‘complementarity’***

The heuristic sense of ‘complementarity’ idea is connected with the overcoming of human consciousness, who aims at the world of ‘universal human’ values in the darkness of the experienced moment. The consciousness of the subject, surely, can be in the darkness of every existence ‘in-itself’. With this the other feelings and emotions of the person sink into vacancy. So, the person finding himself in the rather vast space of observation, cannot overcome the ‘dark’ environment through which he is distinct from the very reality, where the person often is at the bottom, and is, hence, incapable to see what surrounds him. But the person nevertheless can ‘grasp’ that which is outside him, and to ‘get satiated’ with this earthly world.

The ‘transcendental subject’ means, virtually, something basic and fundamental, which finally grows first. This ‘subject’ aims at calming down in the measure of his human existence with the other, spiritual and moral existence.

This means that the very ‘transcendental subject’ in our epoch of the increase of the topical character of peoples’ complementary thinking idea, should move forward to something troublesome. Vacancy, of course, satiates the need of the person, which issues, essentially, out of it as some prototype of the world completeness. But the subject, given into the power of material satisfaction, can never stop the spiritual enjoyment of the present. The concept of ‘complementarity’, thus, teaches us that we as the people of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, ceased to be simple ‘collectors’ of things, and also of the senses and meanings of the existing socio-cultural experience. We find ourselves aimed at the subtle sense of things and events.

The person, who really wants to establish in his life the principles of wariness and complementarity of thinking, is, as a rule, confronted with something unexpected. But this unexpected, finally, destroys the pivotal point of N. Bohr’s doctrine, according to which the very idea of the objective coverage of experience facts should turn to those circumstances, by means of which these data are received [10].

The heuristic sense of the ‘complementarity’ idea is incompatible with the ability of consciousness to split into parts, which often mutually ignore each other. But the very objects of cognition still remain complementary to each other. When we accentuate some object, we separate it from another object [11].

Take heed that the profound analysis of any notion excludes other notions. Thus, the analysis of the notion of ‘complementarity’, in the line with the spirit of careful dealing with other universals, puts forward the issue that, at first glance, being connected with the difficulties of introspective study of thinking, does not allow the split of thought. The quick motion of the thought towards the spiritual and moral future often results in the possible stop of the thought but, at the same time, may satiate it with the spirit of settling the relations. Thus, the result of the thought movement towards the static and at the same time beautiful future is characterized by the tendency to role in all the ‘negative’ in the life process of thinking itself.

### ***3.8. The difficulties of reflection and the sense of complementarity conception***

N. Bohr himself liked to illustrate the difficulties in reflection with the example taken from the book by P.M. Moeller ‘The Adventures of the Danish Student’. N. Bohr turned to the idea of interrelation of different aspects of human existence and a rather completely expressed sense that distinguishes modern students and their views of the modern life [12].

Our thoughts do not enable us to do anything. We have to think about our own thoughts, of the present situation. We even think that we are reflecting thoughts now. As a result, the thoughts themselves fall into ‘self-perception’, which is characterized by the concentration of thought on the unknown, and into

those ‘-selves’, which aim at reality. By means of our reflections, we form such a ‘-self’, which finally has to realize the moral choice [13]. The ‘-self’ of the person as much as peeps into some enormous abyss, and with this is split into many ‘-selves’, which get intertwined with each other. As a result, the ‘self’ itself, which is self-perception, becomes ‘sparkling’, so to speak.

Human thinking does not develop until it passes the limits of time, aimed at the benefit and its quick achievement. The ‘transcendental subject’ as the subject not only purely gnoseological, but having a vast functional field, is not connected with the slow rhythm of the person, studying real processes.

The subject, studying these processes, is oriented towards the idea of transcendental freedom, towards the reconstruction of the given idea in Fichte’s works, in its relation to modernity [8].

This freedom is first caused to life by something inconspicuous, but initially possible. It is surely subject to the original ‘shock’. Freedom trembles a little; it at once vanishes into non-existence, turning to the very ‘core’ of the problem: can the unnoticeable and subtle sound so quietly that even for everything inconspicuous in this world one can find words to express spiritual contents?

### ***3.9. The principle of complementarity and the complete picture of the world***

The idea of complementarity could become the first ‘step’ towards the complete picture of the world, where the natural sciences themselves are united with humanitarian sciences. The ‘transcendental subject’ realizes the very essence of the process of cognition. This subject comes into the state of spiritual expiration, when the images of the ‘unconscious’ become inseparable from the influence of the given images on ‘complementarity’.

We mean the very ‘archetypical’ ideas which influence the formation of theories. To study the sense of ‘complementarity’, it is necessary to advance constantly. We think that mutual influence of complementary aspects of the process puts forward the setting of the problem among the complementary aspects of the phenomenon. Otherwise, this setting proves devoid of any sense.

Angelina Nuzzo writes that Fichte’s ‘act – action’ corresponds to the dialectics and the spirit of Reformation [14].

The ‘transcendental subject’ expresses some surprise which is not overfilled with the holistic view of the world, stipulated by the reasons of cultural, practical significance. And, nevertheless, the mental shock does not lessen from the first questioning of the subject of the very existence of the empirical world. The surprise, with which the introspection begins, remains loyal to itself. The very subject of surprise may change, of course, but not in its entire cultural thesaurus, which is aimed, in our opinion, at the things become [15]. The surprise of the person remains true to itself.

Though the spiritual deepness of the ‘surprise’ may change, not aimed at something become, or stable, the problem of heuristic potentials of the ‘transcendental subject’ remains, in principle, incomplete.

In the whole existence today we hear the questioning of everything existent, which is difficult to answer, taking into account only itself. All the separate, momentary formulations of the problem are some variations of the spiritual impulse, issuing from surprise, from which, in principle, the cognition starts.

Let us think, first of all, of the very position, the positioning of world outlook in the knowledge is determined by the positioning of the world outlook itself. Nonsense repels us to the very subject of Philosophy [16]. With this, the problem of that beautiful moment, where we deal with the issue of 'complementarity' quite otherwise, is characterized by a relatively little age.

The 'transcendental subject' should not keep us in delusion and mystery as to the dreams of surprise, concerning the future world.

The thing that seems unusual to the person, deals with him completely, but at the same time makes him behave carefully while treating the existing doctrines. The 'transcendental subject' – and in it we experience Fichte as a whole – is connected with the realization of the prospects of modernity [17].

The human personality is connected with the statement, which consists in the immediate semi-transparency of social relations. The person has never been what it was not. The person is not the way of '-self' existence. The person is always postulated as the former, the past, but having the depths of the '-self'.

As a result, the 'ego' itself is expressed for the consciousness in the form of 'transcendental in-self' beginning as existing in the really human world. But from this point it is difficult to conclude that 'for-the-self' is a pure and simple 'impersonal' content.

The spiritual, personalistic existence simply is. That is why personalism does not turn out as connected with the pure reference to the 'ego' as its '-self'. This reference transforms into the simple self-centred relation, where the 'centre' itself is the core of intransparency. The non-religious personalism is unattainable for the existence. Indeed, how to define the personality otherwise than free relation to him-/herself?

But these prospects are not connected with the fact that the person, in principle, is limited by the narrow character of his cultural place. The very spiritual prospect does not expand at all, if the person gets a higher position in the world. The person, unfortunately, often leaves out the thing, with which he deals at present. He fights the spirit of dissatisfaction, which underlies the whole cultural matter. The person is afraid of that 'purity', bareness of existence, which accompanies him, as a rule. The very attempt to join, to connect the existence and cognition often leads to the fact, that the world of the subject starts to be characterized by complexity and contrastive character of the real world [18].

At this point the real world should correspond to those characteristics, which answer for putting into practice of the idea of 'complementarity' in Biology and Psychology [19].

The 'transcendental subject' aims at incongruity to the understanding of life itself as an elementary and fragmentary phenomenon [20, 21]. This understanding deviates from the classic way of object description. The object



now is to get the matter-objective conceptuality, i.e. the definite character of its existence and at the same time – the heuristic character, which is included in the space of the subject. To cover and study all the aspects of the subject, it is necessary to investigate all its connections and mediations.

#### **4. Discussion and conclusions**

The ‘transcendental subject’ as a more complex subject from the point of view of the contents, than the purely ‘gnoseological’ subject, is some ‘ensemble’ of multiple ‘-selves’, proving complementary to each other, especially in the epoch of globalization. The idea of ‘complementarity’ could become the first ‘step’ in the way of approaching towards the complete general spiritual picture of the world, where the natural, social and humanitarian sciences achieve their unity.

The ‘transcendental subject’ as the subject of its many existing forces can be studied beyond the natural scientific cognition. In the times of globalization such a subject needs a complementary way of description, which is necessary for the study of fundamental regularities, in nature, society and which cannot be covered by some single ‘picture’ and tend to take a very definite place in each sphere of reality.

The understanding of ‘transcendental subject’ as a system of many ‘-selves’ presupposes the idea of ‘complementarity’, which paves its way in different spheres of thought and human action (the idea of ‘multidimensional languages’ in linguistics, the idea of ‘economic complementarity’ of spatially distant spheres of events, the complementarity between the structure and the dynamics of economic systems, etc.).

The heuristic sense of the ‘complementarity’ idea is mostly expressed on the verge of the ‘phenomenal’ and the spiritual worlds. This practically means the reproduction of the very sense of the problem of social, moral ideals, the sense of ‘practical reason’, the survival of the person in the times of globalization. The ‘transcendental subject’ incorporates in itself the freedom and the moral spirit, which in the epoch of technology prove complementary to each other.

The idea of ‘transcendental subject’ brings a significant amendment in the discussion of heuristic sense of ‘complementarity’ idea, according to which the continuation of the history of thought treatment represents rich material for the formulation of prospects for the development of the ‘transcendental subject’ idea. One of these prospects is the very definition of modern methodology as vastly multilevel. The discussion and its character are defined, in our opinion, by the collision of the ‘transcendental subject’, understood as purely ‘gnoseological’, theoretical-cognitive and its understanding in a wider functional range, i.e. the ‘transcendental subject’, considered in the context of ‘complementarity’ idea, crystallizes in itself communicative, cultural, theoretical-cognitive senses.

The idea of ‘multilevel’ methodology incorporates, apart from the philosophical and specifically scientific insinuation, some intermediary level, connected with the realization of the ‘bridge’ between the noumenal and the phenomenal levels of the subject and its cognitive activity analysis.

The discussion of the problem of the ‘transcendental’ and the ‘complementary’ relation is held not only around the very interpretation of the idea of ‘complementarity’, but also around the problem of the ratio of the ‘transcendental subject’ idea and the idea of ‘complementarity’ on a wide methodological basis.

The point is here not only in the fact that the very ‘idea of complementarity’ has the outcome beyond the limits of physics and the very spirit of natural sciences, but in the fact that ‘complementarity’ itself, together with the ‘transcendental –self’ have not always been acclaimed on the part of those authors, who aimed at purely classical view of the problems.

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