INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN RELIGION, FUNDAMENTALISM AND TERRORISM

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Abstract

International terrorism is considered one of the most important problems and challenges for global security in the 21st century. The discourse that is taking place between politicians, scientists and researchers of this phenomenon is focused primarily on how to alleviate the problem, while downplaying some of the causes that underlie the activities of modern extremists. The purpose of the article is to analyse the relationship between international terrorism and the extreme - fundamentalist interpretation of religion. The author of the text tries to find an answer to the following questions: What is the role of religion in the modern world? How is it interpreted by its followers? To what extent does it interfere in the policy of the state? Is religion really the dominant source of modern terrorist activities? To this end, we introduce the definition of fundamentalism and advance the thesis that the extreme - perverted form of faith generates aggression, violence and becomes a kind of 'alibi' and at the same time an inspiration for extremist actions. We point to the problem of misinterpreting religious dogmas and using them for political purposes. We also emphasise the necessity of entering into inter-civilization dialogue as the only method guaranteeing global security in the 21st century. The considerations in the text below will focus on the religion of Islam, because in the author's opinion, it is this religion that is currently the main stimulus of fundamentalism, and consequently international terrorism in the present century.

Keywords: religion, terrorism, fundamentalism, global security, Islam

1. Introduction

The statement that over centuries religion has often been a subversive force does not raise any doubts. It has frequently violated and sometimes even overthrown the existing cultural, social or political order. Oftentimes being an inspiration for a revolution it has been capable of destroying the current *status quo* and introducing its own, in accordance with the adopted religious ideology [1].

In today's reality, this situation has not changed at all, on the contrary, it can be assumed that it has taken on an even more spectacular dimension. The fact that the contemporary resort to religion does not result only from the new form of

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expressing faith or from the emergence of a new concept testifies to this. It is not just an escape - a reaction to 'evil'. On the contrary, it is to a large extent a purely political manoeuvre, not related to religion (though appealing to the Bible, the Koran, or other holy books [2]). An expedient that uses religion to solve problems resulting from various kinds of differences (secular, ethnic, national, etc.).

It is a truism to say that religion has a significant impact on shaping individual or group (social) morality. Seeing the world through the prism of 'good' and 'evil' it indicates what is right and what is wrong. That is why there is such a close relationship between the political and religious systems and such a strong relationship between religion and power [3].

The last two centuries were to a large extent characterised by a departure from the 'cult of faith' in favour of the 'cult of gaining' (progress). Intellectuals of that period were more interested in the development of civilization than in the development of the inner sphere of man. This situation lasted until the end of the 1980s, when the 'settlement of history' ('the destruction of the Berlin Wall' in 1989, the collapse of the USSR in 1991) took place. A new vision of the international order appeared. A concept that gave a different legitimacy to the specific *Weltanschaung* based on religious values that were widely believed to have disappeared from the political scene a long time ago. As a result, to various (a lesser or a greater) degrees political leaders approved a new global order in which the role of 'first fiddle' fell to the United States, that is the power with conservative religious trends, which was evident during the presidency of Bush father and son. Unfortunately, as Georges Corm claims, "the western appeal to religion, whether it involves so-called Judeo-Christian values or recourse to the fundamentalist creeds of the American Protestant Church, testifies much less to the return of the religious than to its opposite, the instrumental use of religion. It derives from the need to lend a veneer of legitimacy to political actions which in another non-religious case would be perceived as being completely unlawful." [4]

This is why for Muslims Western civilization appears today as superficial, consumption-based and is associated primarily with all pathologies: alcoholism, drugs, prostitution, abortion, euthanasia, vulgar magazines and obscene behaviour of politicians. With moral and ethical decline [5].

Discussions and questions about the roots of religious violence, xenophobia and aggression are constantly raised by social science researchers. Since there is no, and probably never will be, an unambiguous answer to the question about a religious stimulus for struggle, a definitive statement in this respect will certainly never be made. Undoubtedly, however, the overwhelming argumentation is related to the fact that collectively professed religious visions and images generate a sense of group identification and common identity. As a result, 'collectively' held beliefs can lead to distrust, aggression and lack of acceptance for strangers - individuals from outside the group [6].

2. Religion - the essence and interpretation

Religion, or rather its multidimensional variations, is perceived radically by believers and analysts who deal with this problem, as evidenced by the fact that there are almost two hundred different definitions of it. Some believe that all faiths in the world actually represent one and the same religion. Others argue that all theistic forms compete with each other and are mutually exclusive. The veracity of one religion automatically undermines the existence and authenticity of another [7]. And this interpretation may constitute a germ of the fight - a war with everyone who breaks away from the adopted religious canon.

Already at the end of the last century, G. Minois claimed that "the war is about much more than just matters of territory, honour, loot, or ideology. It is connected with the subconscious, primitive and irrational forces inherent in man, and so with what man calls the sacred" [8]. According to this researcher of the problem, it has been perfectly assimilated in religions. They have incorporated war into their myths. They have shown thereby that warfare is not a secondary aspect, an excess, a cultural phenomenon, but an important and natural reality. Quoting, in turn, T. Eagleton, "The affinity between terror and the sacred may sound peculiarly, even offensively irrelevant to the terrorism of our own time. There is nothing especially saintly about tearing someone's head from their shoulders in the name of Allah the All-Merciful, or burning Arab children to death in the cause of democracy. Yet it is not wholly possible to understand the notion of terror without also grasping this curious double-edgedness. Terror begins as a religious idea, as indeed much terrorism still is today; and religion is all about deeply ambivalent powers which both enrapture and annihilate." [9] Does this prove that religion is in fact the dominant source of terrorist activities?

Two basic and extremely different interpretations come to mind. The first one negates the theory that religion is the source of terrorism. It assumes that religious differences have never been a true motive of conflicts, wars, colonisation, terrorism, or ill treatment of infidels. They have only been a kind of alibi, justification for such behaviours. Such an interpretation takes into account the existence of a certain category of people (fundamentalists, religious fanatics, integrists) who, in specific social, political or economic conditions, are convinced that they act in the name of their faith. Their appearance is closely related to the emergence of an unfavourable situation, in the face of which they become powerless and helpless. Proponents of this interpretation claim that although religion is the driving force of fanatics' activity, it is not religion but the perverted ideology of its followers that has created a favourable situation for their activity. The other, different assessment, presents religion as the basic source of all evil. It assumes that all religions (without exception) have always divided more than united people. Most often they have been a source of suffering, conflicts, spiritual or physical violence. They have been conductive to human proximity and kindness only occasionally [10]. P. Boyer believes that people who are deeply religiously involved, often without restraint use violence against those who are either not strongly engaged or do not recognise their religion. In his opinion, faith

and common gods create and unite a group, which eventually leads to xenophobia, isolationism and even morbid hatred [11]. Hence, 'religious terrorists' appear, that is, a group of people who make a religious over-interpretation for their own needs. Bruce Hoffman stresses that although, paradoxically, most religions by definition do not approve of evil, and moral indicators of almost every one of them are: love, understanding and tolerance, then using them as a weapon against other people or customs changes their moral dimension. Sublime and noble religious assumptions, interpreted differently, become then a stimulus leading to distortions and fanaticism [12]. For so-called religious terrorists, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty carried out in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. A transcendental act inflicting morally justified large-scale violence believing that it is expedient for the attainment of their goal. Guided by a distinct - for them more important - system of values, different justification and worldview, they will not turn back from massive attacks, which in terms of the number of victims are incomparably greater than the attacks of secular extremists.

3. Religious hermeticism and intolerance of 'infidels'

And here we come to the problem of intolerance. The lack of understanding for a different religious tradition, expressed by the non-acceptance of unalike behaviours of people raised in different cultures and environments. Although it may seem obvious that the entire world society does not have to conform to the same customs and ethical standard, and that it is difficult to expect that Catholics, for example, follow the principles of the Koran and Muslims identify with the religion of Christians, but this principle is unacceptable for some cultural, civilizational or religious circles [13].

It is normal that despite the ever-progressing process of globalisation and unification of the world, there are still many elements that differentiate societies. These differences generate the need to develop intercultural and interreligious dialogue, which would create a platform for understanding over differences, divisions, over nations. Unfortunately, nowadays this diversity is interpreted first of all as evil - demoralisation of infidels (especially representatives of Western culture), and not as the driving force of social development. Instead of benefits, which should undoubtedly result from the diversity of cultures, traditions, experiences, etc., it primarily generates misunderstanding, aggression and, in an extreme shape, takes the form of acts of terrorism [14].

Despite the fact that this problem is not a new phenomenon, because almost three decades ago (in 1991), the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue defined the need to work out a system in favour of the correctness of relations between different religions, so far it has been difficult to notice any progress in this matter. Although the members of the above-mentioned Council noted already at that time that a condition for world peace is the respect of worshipper of various religions for four main points: the dialogue of life, the dialogue of action, the dialogue of religious experience and especially the

dialogue of theological exchange, from the perspective of time it can be noticed that stereotypes functioning within religion prevent mutual tolerance, respect and acceptance [15].

4. Religion and politics

Another important problem, apart from intolerance, which spurs contemporary terrorists to action, is the symbiosis between religion and politics.

In the modern world, religion is one of the factors conditioning political processes and phenomena both at the state level and on the global scale. Although in theory religion and politics are assigned to two different spheres, it is difficult to ignore the fact that they are currently subject to dynamic interaction. Religion, as a carrier of values or ideas, influences decisions made by politicians, society and, unfortunately, extremists, and these transform the religious system into a political war [16].

The scale of the symbiosis between religion and politics depends strictly on the specificity of the civilizational and cultural circle. The closeness of the symbiosis in Western civilization, grown on the basis of the Judeo-Christian tradition, will be different from that in Islamic culture. The influence of the religious factor is also affected by the shape of the political system and the status of religion in a given country, resulting from the adopted constitutional solutions, as well as the demand for religion on the part of the society itself [17].

As M. Borucki writes, "Islam is second largest world religion after Christianity as far as the number of followers is concerned. Just like in every religion, the followers of Islam differ in the way of determining the place of religion in social and political life and in everyday practices. No doubt however, unlike Christians, all Muslims refer to religion in every aspect of their lives." [18] In order to understand this, first of all, we should consider the conception of the semantics of the term 'religion' in cultures of the West and the East. Representatives of European or American democracy, where religion is usually strictly separated from politics and state affairs, interpret it completely differently from Muslim nations that treat secular life as a manifestation of religion and religion as a recipe for secular life. Unlike other religions, Islam has developed legal regulations for domains belonging to state policy [19].

Unfortunately, this way of thinking can generate a whole range of threats about which Józef Tischner wrote in his two book: 'Nieszczęsny dar wolności' and 'W krainie schorowanej wyobraźni' at the end of the last century. He defined precisely the danger stemming from the alliance of power and religion. In the first of these publications we can read that: "political religion changes the meaning of faith. Faith which has become a tool of politics loses its strictly religious dimension. But politics also must undergo transformation (...) Political religion is not about the rule of law, but about the ruler's power. The exploitation of religion is aimed at absolute rule." [20]

In addition, religion very often becomes an ideology of actions or a kind of policy when its main task is to oppose the existing order, attempt to change it and reform it. The person who believes that he is right, regardless of the source of inspiration (supernatural forces or ideologies), appeals to a wider audience in order to communicate these views to them. Due to the fact that it is not always met with approval, on the contrary - the convictions do not gain understanding but encounter resistance, he resorts to other, forceful methods of persuasion [21].

At what point does the follower of a given religion or ideology choose the path of violence? According to A. Parzymies, above all when he wants to impose his ideology. When he is struggling with political, economic or power problems. Also in a situation when another ideology or religion is a threat to him, the possibility of losing support and power becomes dominant and probable [22]. These are arguments that, in the opinion of the person concerned, justify the arguments of force, violence and terrorism.

5. Religion and terrorism

Islam is a religion whose goal is to create the God's state and win over as many followers as possible. As stated earlier, it combines secular and religious matters, therefore it has a dual nature. As emphasised by J.G. Jansen, it would be a mistake to analyse Islam only as a religion, because it is also a political movement. It is also a mistake to understand it only as a political movement, because it is also a religion [23].

It is from this unity that the phenomenon of modern Islamic terrorism originates, the one which today, based on the dogma of faith and in the name of the most holy religion, strives to form a theocratic religious state. The one whose leaders use the blind faith of their soldiers, deftly manipulating their fanaticism and intolerance, as well as full devotion to the cause. They rely on soldiers who are easy to manipulate, ready in their uncritical perception of reality to scarify their lives in the name of "a sacred cause" [24].

While the general trend of returning to Islam was intended to help societies find truth and love in their lives, the extremists began to use these basic religious values to steer people to achieve political goals. Contemporary Islamic extremism is not proof of the revival of religiosity. On the contrary, it very clearly illustrates the on-going process of politicisation of faith [25].

Of course, the exploitation of religion for extremist activities is not a new phenomenon. Religion and terrorism have a long, shared history although in the last century this relationship has been dominated by terrorism with national liberation or ideological motivations. At the beginning of the 'era of modern terrorism', at the end of the 1960s, none of the terrorist groups operating at the time had religious, e.g. Islamic motivation. Even Palestinian groups, after all composed of Muslims, had a rather separatist or Marxist-Leninist character. The first Islamic terrorist organisations appeared at the turn of the 70's and 80's. From then on they can be classified as definitely Islamic, i.e. having such character and motivations.

Modern Islamic terrorism was born thanks to the success of the Shia revolution in Iran (1978-1979). This event provided a stimulus for its wide development. A decade later there were already numerous fundamentalist organisations and their activity covered practically the whole world. Since the early 1990s, terrorist Islamic groups have accounted for over 1/3 of all identified extremist groups, and the most serious and bloodiest terrorist attacks since the beginning of the 21st century have been carried out by Islamists (al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram or ISIS - Islamic State [26]). Among others: the attack on the World Trade Center 11.09.2001 New York (3,000 victims), the attack on Bali 12.10.2002 (202 victims, about 350 wounded), the attack on the Madrid underground 11.03.2004 (191 victims, over 1,400 injured), the attack on the London underground 7.05.2005 (52 dead, 700 injured), the attack in Sharm El Sheikh 23.07.2005 (70 victims, over 150 wounded), bombing in Til Ezer 14.08.2007 (796 killed, about 1,600 wounded), Mumbai attacks 26-29.11.2008 (195 dead, 300 wounded), the attack in Mogadishu 4.10.2011, (139 victims, around 100 wounded), a series of attacks in Paris 13.11.2015 (137 victims, 300 wounded), the attack on a shopping centre in Baghdad 3.07.2016 (292 victims, 225 wounded), the attack at the Manchester Arena 22.05.2017 (22 victims, 59 wounded), the attack in Mogadishu 9.11.2018 (53 victims, over 100 people injured), terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka 21.04.2019 (257 victims, over 500 wounded) and many others

6. Fundamentalism - the essence of the problem

The presentation and explanation of the phenomenon of fundamentalism is necessary for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between religious and secular life. It is important to stress here that this phenomenon should not be interpreted only in the aspect of Islamic religious extremes, and also that it is impossible to unambiguously assume that fundamentalism is only a religious extreme of action. This is confirmed by the fact that nowadays it is not uncommon to see purely secular motivation in fundamentalists' activities, which perfectly fits into the rhetoric of over interpreting religion for political purposes.

It also seems problematic to formulate an unambiguous answer to the question whether, considering that it has only a religious character, it also applies to other religions or to only monotheistic ones? What lies at the heart of religious fundamentalism? Is it the result of an 'excess of faith' - manifesting itself as an extreme form of religious affiliation, or on the contrary, the effect of 'scarcity of faith' - a political ideology striving to gain power, using religious 'anointment'?

Another problem is the precise determination of whether fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon resulting from the globalisation process, or did it started earlier than the last quarter of the century? Finally, there are doubts about whether terrorist activity is an unavoidable consequence of the development of fundamentalism, or is it only one of the variants of the activities of fundamentalist groups?

At this point, it seems important to clarify the role of religion in terrorism. Trying to answer the question whether, as a factor of cultural identity, it is the basic conflict stimulus or only a symbol of social, economic and political disputes obscuring real motives.

Fundamentalism is interpreted in a variety of ways. Some researchers of the subject particularly highlight the political ideology of fundamentalism, claiming that it becomes religious fundamentalism only after being combined with religion [25, p. 72]. They are of the opinion that a radical version of fundamentalism is based on totalitarian ideas and in order to implement them it adopts all forms of fight, among others, terrorism. They also claim that fundamentalism is a form of political participation manifested by the lack of the ability to compromise and dialogue, striving to introduce social changes ideologically inspired by the transcendent source of values [27].

Others, e.g. Andrzej Bronk, define fundamentalism through the prism of differences between the areas of its occurrence. They distinguish cultural, socio-political, religious or philosophical fundamentalism [28]. They stress the fact that the socio-political variation of fundamentalism is synonymous with political extremism and may manifest itself in a fascist or nationalist form that emphasises its racial, ethnic, cultural or ideological distinctiveness [29]. They highlight this distinctness and the related process of isolationism, reductionism and lack of ability to dialogue manifested by strong tenacity [30].

In turn, according to Agnes Heller the main characteristic of fundamentalism is isolationism. She claims that it is dictated by the fear of modern progress, the fear of losing security, identity and the certainty of existence. She identifies it with a closed system of religious and secular views that does not accept other beliefs [31]. Steve Bruce, on the other hand, thinks that the sources of fundamentalism can be found not only in disputes of the group of believers about what God requires, but also in almost entirely secular nationalistic struggles. He claims that we will not understand the phenomenon of fundamentalism by trying to interpret and analyse it in isolation from the social, economic and political contexts in which it appears [1, p. 18]. This definition confirms the concept that interprets fundamentalism as a world view, a political movement, or a kind of social activity. A collection of dominant ideas, the core of which is a system of values that aspire to being indisputably universal and exclusively legitimate. After politicisation, religion can constitute the basis of extremist attitudes and ideas [32].

From the very wording of this term one can infer that the base, the dogma of life of representatives of religious fundamentalism [5, p. 255] is the original, traditional form of religious values, closed to changes, modernity and modernisation. (**Fundamentalism** (Latin) - the general name of religious movements that recognise the dominant value of religious traditions and are reluctant to any changes felt as a violation of religious identity (…) having a negative attitude to modernist tendencies (modernism) (…) In Islam in the twentieth century (also known as Islamism or Islamic integrism), Muslim traditionalism is defined which opposes reform trends in Islam; the main aim of

Muslim fundamentalist movements (e.g. Sunni, Shiism, Wahhabism, Association of Muslim Brothers) is to base the state on Islamic law. [33]) Hermetically focused on everything that is alien, it automatically rejects, fights and destroys different values and beliefs. Thus, 21st century religious fundamentalism is a form of rebirth - a renaissance - of religion [34].

Jurgen Habermas emphasises that the term 'fundamentalism' has a pejorative undertone. "We use this predicate to characterise a peculiar mindset, a stubborn attitude that insists on the political imposition of its own convictions and reasons, even when they are far from being rationally acceptable. This holds especially for religious beliefs. We should certainly not confuse fundamentalism with dogmatism and orthodoxy. Sometimes there is an authority such as the pope or the Roman congregation, which determines what interpretations deviate from this dogma and, therefore, from orthodoxy. Such orthodoxy firsts veers toward fundamentalism when the guardians and representatives of the true faith ignore the epistemic situation of a pluralistic society and insist - even to the point of violence - on the universally binding character and political acceptance of their doctrine." [35]

In turn, J. Czaja is of the opinion that fundamentalism, in itself, is neither violence nor terrorism. What is more, violence is not beneficial for pure fundamentalism as it is an attempt to come back to the sources of religion, to its foundations. An attempt to cleanse the religion of all later accretions, additions, growths. An attempt to return to the original faith of the ancestors. Violence could thwart this attempt. The problem, however, is that fundamentalism is an extreme manifestation of the profession of faith, it politicises it, combining it with many other phenomena of internal and international life. This, in turn, introduces factors typical for politics, including the factor of force and violence, into this sphere of distorted ideology. Therefore - and for many other reasons - religious fundamentalism turns into violence for religious reasons, and finally into terrorism. In this case religious reasons become a command, an imperative. The goals and means are unlimited, and the deed itself takes the form of a sacramental act. As a result of that the act of violence becomes a fundamentalist act of God himself [36].

Moreover, according to many sociologists and political scientists, hunger, poverty and the global crisis of values are the cause of the birth and development of fundamentalism. This phenomenon is characteristic not only for the Muslim world [37]. Bassam Tibi claims that "there are Christian, as well as Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and Confucian fundamentalisms. At the same time Muslim fundamentalism is a variant of the phenomenon that we deal with all over the world. It is especially striking to us because politicised Islam, in contrast to, for example, Hindu fundamentalism, makes universal claims." [38]

Another argument influencing the activity of Islamic fundamentalists is insufficient, and sometimes almost negligible care of their own state. Already Samuel P. Huntington wrote that "the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human

solidarity. Religious groups meet social needs left untended by state bureaucracies. These include the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergartens and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare and social support during periods of economic deprivation. The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist, groups." [39]

As a result of that also so-called dysfunctional states (failed states, fragile states) are the cradle of Islamic fundamentalism. States in which representatives of power cannot, or do not want to provide their citizens with conditions for decent living, development and security. Not paying attention to the problems faced by their citizens every day, virtually in every aspect they contribute to the violation of human rights [40]. According to the *Fragile States Index 2019* report, in the top 10 states ranked as the weakest countries in the world, the majority are countries in which the dominant or significant religion is Islam, e.g. Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Chad, Sudan or Afghanistan. (*Fragile States Index 2019* - is an annual report published by the United States think tank the Fund for Peace and the American magazine *Foreign Policy* from 2005 to 2018, then by The New Humanitarian since 2019.) In turn, the *Global Terrorism Inex 2018* shows that the greatest threat of terrorism and the largest number of terrorist attacks in 2018 took place in such countries as: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Egypt, that is also in Muslim countries [41]. (*Global Terrorism Index 2018* - is a report published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and was developed by IT entrepreneur and IEP's founder Steve Killelea. The index provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism since 2000.)

And finally we come to the most characteristic feature of Islamic fundamentalism, which is an extremely anti-Western attitude. Islamic fundamentalists interpret Western civilization as a foreign and hostile civilization. Acting 'in the name of God' they reject all secular values, oppose the global order and the supra-cultural morality. Their main goal is to revive their local cultures and mobilise their own nation to rebel against introducing the Western canons of values and social order into their lives [42].

They discriminate against the secular nation-state, perceiving it as a tool created by the Western world aimed at dividing the Muslim *umma* (the universal 'imaginary community' of all Muslims). The activities of fundamentalists are, therefore, an expression of rebellion against the West, and especially against modern forms of democracy and the spreading global order. They are a specific reaction to the introduction of reforms and attempts to separate religion from the state. This phenomenon is connected with the rejection of European social and political life patterns and the return to the traditional foundation, which is Islam. Western culture is interpreted by Muslims as a threat to the traditional values of Islam, and this gives them permission to flout all ethical and moral principles to fight in defence of this religion [43].

7. Conclusions

Analysing all the above arguments, there is no doubt that the ***coalescence*** of religion and fundamentalism and of fundamentalism and terrorism is one of the most important problems and challenges for global security. Just like the fact that Islamic terrorism is extremely dangerous and poses a serious threat to Western democracy. Downplayed and underestimated for many years, only due to the events of 11 September 2001, it made the world aware of how volatile and unpredictable it can be.

Of course, in today's Islamic terrorism, political, economic or cultural factors play an important role, but the problem lies primarily in fear and distrust of infidels. Fear developing on the basis of superstitions and stereotypes, and resulting from prejudices and lack of mutual knowledge. Fear that generates misunderstanding, non-acceptance of otherness and lack of will to reconcile. Although the followers of the three main monotheistic religions belong to one God's family, until there is no peace between religions, there will also be no peace between nations. As S. Huntington wrote: "For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others" [39].

Unfortunately, at present it is difficult to discern even the desire for intercultural dialogue, and religious distinctness, civilizational diversity and lack of tolerance for different views give rise to aggression and become an inspiration for more and more extremist activities of terrorist groups.

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