European Journal of Science and Theology, *April 2023, Vol.19, No.2, 53-75*

DESCARTES' 'NEW CLOTHES' CARTESIAN THOUGHT IN PHILOSOPHY, NEUROSCIENCE AND THEISM

Joshua R. Farris*

Ruhr Universität Bochum, Catholic Theological Faculty, Chair of Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of Science, Building GA 7/136 Ruhr University, Bochum, 44780, Germany

(Received 25 November 2022, revised 27 January 2023)

Abstract

At times intellectuals in the history of Philosophy are likened to the famous expression: the emperor has no clothes. This is often the case for Rene Descartes, yet it is more accurate to say that he is the emperor with new clothes, but few are willing to admit it. In what follows, I trace some of the recent developments in contemporary philosophy of mind and its overlap with Neuroscience and analytic theology. All three disciplines, interestingly, are confronted with the same problem as found in Descartes' time and writings, and the solutions provided are strikingly similar to and beginning to look more like Descartes' substantial dualism with the ineliminable 'I' or first-person perspective and irreducible consciousness. In fact, these finds seem to indicate the need for methodological dualism or pluralism that comprise a new science (akin to Descartes' aspirations) rather than a naturalistic methodology. For these reasons, the following is a cross between analytic philosophy, the history of Philosophy, and analytic theism as a way to investigate Descartes' influence in Philosophy, Neuroscience and theism.

Keywords: qualia, internalism, non-reductive physicalism, dualism, divine action

1. Introduction

Descartes' influence is often hidden in the background of history. He is likened to the notion that he is the emperor with no clothes because his ideas are perceived as dated, embarrassing, and simply a historical novelty that should remain in the past. But, what I will show is that he should be likened to the emperor with new clothes as his influence remains with us. Rather than wearing no clothes, he has been redressed for the times [1].

Some of the most fascinating and important discussions occur separately in analytic philosophy as well as intellectual history, but far less frequently do they occur together. While Rene Descartes has become the whipping boy of nearly all academic disciplines, he is also one of the central fixtures and

*E-mail: joshua.r.farris@gmail.com, Joshua.Farris@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

influences in the history of ideas and analytic thought (as well as the continental tradition) [2]. And, despite some perceptions that he has somehow been extracted from the more important discussions, his mark on intellectual history remains in contemporary reflections [3]. Some have referred to this as Descartes' 'residue' because of its sticky and elastic nature seemingly finding its way into all facets of intellectual discourse. What remains is that Descartes' mark is felt in Philosophy, Neuroscience, and theistic philosophy [4].

In what follows, I will explore some of the recent developments in Philosophy, Neuroscience, and implications toward theism by showing that Descartes' mark continues to leave an impression. To date, contemporary philosophical literature has taken some notice by tracing his stamp. Tom Sorell, in *Descartes Reinvented*, stands out as the most apparent and explicit example. I will consider some more recent examples of this tradition that needs highlighting. It is also important to note that there have been some noticeable places in Neuroscience and what I will call theistic philosophy deserving the reflection of contemporary thinkers. But, here is the problem with recent implicit attempts to revise Descartes (and the Cartesian tradition): they all end up obscuring the nature of the mind as metaphysically fundamental as that which is initially clear, and they fail to advance a solution to the same problem that has advantages over Descartes' solution.

2. The history of mind, background and methodology

Descartes holds a unique place in the history of Philosophy and Science of the mind. This much seems trivially true in discussions surrounding the mind. But precisely where he fits into the discussion deserves more careful scrutiny. In what follows, I show that his influence is felt as it pertains to the uniqueness of mental properties (as it is captures the qualitative feel, first-person perspective, and the subject of experiences), which yields what contemporary philosophers of mind call property dualism - i.e. properties of a mental sort as distinct from properties of a physical sort. Interestingly, what we see in contemporary Philosophy and Neuroscience, is a trajectory from what analytics call physicalism (in the form of the identity thesis and the reductive thesis), to property dualism, and back to substance dualism as a plausible ground for these dual sets of properties that yield theism (what some have called 'theistic dualism' because the origin of mental properties is ultimately found in Divine action). In other words, what we see in Descartes is a similar problem of the atomists (what contemporaries call identity or reductive physicalism), which has led to a growing commitment to property dualism. Yet with these growing trends toward property dualism as a solution, it is not clear that these provide an advantage over Descartes' substantial dualism because they leave some explanation of the distinct property-sets out of their picture. The explanations they give gesture in the direction of a resemblance to Descartes' original position of which analytic discussions are ongoing.

As a part of the general background of Descartes in relation to Science, the famous metaphysician William Walsh helpfully summarizes the state of Science in relation to the Natural sciences and Descartes' place in the discussion. He states: "Descartes, who had unbounded confidence in the prospects of the new science, was acutely aware of this threat. He sought to meet it by a division of spheres of influence: body, including human body, could be handed over to the physicists and understood in exclusively mechanical terms, whilst mind was reserved for theologians and philosophers and taken to be a different sort of thing altogether. In offering this compromise, which has still not entirely lost its appeal, Descartes was proposing what he took to be a reasoned alternative to Materialism, a new comprehensive philosophy which could take the place of scholasticism to which the Christian Church had previously pinned its faith." [5]

Highlighting two important points, Walsh points the reader to the significance of Descartes' philosophy as having enduring staying power in Science because of his emphasis on a different kind of inquiry through the mind and as a new way to usher in theism as the necessary consequent explanation. Descartes' enduring legacy is a testament not to the fact that Natural science has shown *that* his ideas have been thrown in the metaphysical waste bin of history, but the contrary. The reason Descartes saw his philosophy as central to a 'new science' has to do with the necessity of the mind as part of the scientific process, thus undermining sense-experience with its contingency alone as a sure footing for knowledge. The mind and, nearby the role of Divine metaphysical grounding provide a surer place, if not a *certain* starting point for scientific investigation.

Walsh rightly points out that the same problem of materialism (which I use synonymous with physicalism) that Descartes confronted in his time is a similar problem in the 1900's with the overwhelming popularity of logical positivism, behaviourism and other reductive approaches to the mind. In its place, Descartes first argues in numerous places for the uniqueness of mental properties, which ultimately leads him to what historians commonly recognize as a version of substance dualism (i.e. the view that these properties are actually tied to or instantiated by different property-bearers, substances). In a similar way in the mid-1900's, we see a similar trend. There was dominance of physicalist sympathy and a reaction to dualism. Gilbert Ryle famously called the 'ghost in the machine' as a critique of dualism [2]. From the 60's onward there is a growing dissatisfaction with physicalist alternatives to the mind and the mind's relation to the body in versions of property dualism. These are especially noteworthy in several analytic philosophers of mind. While attending to what appears to be the same problem, or a similar one, the dissatisfaction leads these figures to a similar solution that appears to make little advancement on Descartes' solution - but this connection often goes unnoticed or at least buried in the background of history.

Granted, Ryle raises an interesting challenge of which Descartes was not unaware - namely the relational union of mind and body [2, p. 168-169, 199-200]. But what is not clear is whether or not Ryle's depiction of substance dualism as found in Descartes and the Cartesian tradition is captured in the

'Ghost in the machine' picture where a little man is hidden inside a machine. Such a picture leaves the impression that the mind and body are not integrated - a feature, arguably, motivated by experience and Neuroscience. Granted Descartes had a variety of proposals to this concern throughout his life. Yet while it is still being debated as to whether his solution has found resolution, what is clear is that his solutions have not, arguably, found a better alternative.

A more sophisticated trend in the history of analytic philosophy of mind, can be seen in the growing impulse amongst contemporary philosophers toward monism. Heidegger certainly represents something of this trend in his treatment of the mind-body relation in the history of Philosophy - although he is hardly recognized as a representative of analytic philosophy. Given the narrow focus on analytic contemporary developments as they parallel some of the historical moods, attitudes, questions, and trends, I will not engage directly with Heidegger - although he is an important figure in the history of Philosophy.

David Skribina notes this impulse in his recognition of the trend toward property dualism and away from substance dualism, yet it is important to point out that this *impulse* is rooted in an intuition shared by some and may be the motive behind property dualists in their reticence to accept what they see as Descartes' substance dualism. Yet, it is also important to point out that these are not decisive in favour of property dualism as having explanatory advantage and, furthermore, the trace to Descartes often once again remains hidden in the background. He states: "There are a few key problems that seem to be primarily responsible for misleading us. One of these, ironically, is that most philosophers of mind do not take the mind seriously. By this I mean that the vast majority hold to some version of physicalism - defined here as a monism in which physical stuff or physical properties are the ultimate reality. In this case mind necessarily takes a back seat. It is dependent upon, or arises from, or supervenes on the physical." [6]

Skrbina helpfully notes two aspects in the history of analytic philosophical discussions. First, there has been a tendency in the history of Philosophy (specifically the analytic tradition) to downplay the significance of the mind and properties characteristic of the mind. Second, he notes the trend toward monism, even if of a physicalist sort, which he proceeds to advance a case for non-physicalist property dualism. But, even this impulse has a corresponding impulse in science with the desire to arrive at a unifying, and secure foundation for knowing the world. This, too, is precipitated in Descartes' singularity first in knowledge regarding consciousness and the self, and the ultimate foundation in the surest place-God. But, then what about property dualism?

As we will see below, there are some challenges with property dualism that provide no advantage over substance dualism. They either require a reduction to the physical or to the mental unless one accepts neutral monism. More to the point, neutral monism yields a mystery that has no advantage over physicalism, property dualism, or substance dualism. The neutral monist trend is motivated by physicalism in so far as Physics is perceived as a base, but what is underlying it is something we could not access. However, if neutral monism

takes it that properties are both conscious and non-conscious, then we have a violation of the principle of noncontradiction. The trend away from neutral monism that retains physicalist sensibilities sees current Physics as failing to grant us knowledge of the mind, hence reality, and awaits a final physics that is to come. Whether this can finally be categorized as physicalism is as yet to be seen.

Narrowing the focus, then, the following will assess the merits of analytic philosophy and Neuroscience in the history of Philosophy by tracing Descartes' stamp concerning the uniqueness of mental properties, which demands a reconceiving of Science on theistic grounds. And, there is some motivation for taking this approach, as some of the most interesting and impactful discussions in the history of the mind are found here. The initial prompt for the significance of this study will begin with Tom Sorell's important work, *Descartes Reinvented*, in the history of the mind through the lens of the analytic tradition.

3. 'Descartes Reinvented' and revisited

Tom Sorell defends the thesis that Descartes' 'residue' is present in contemporary intellectual discussions, and rightly so for far too many problems are common to the naturalist attitude or 'tendency' in Anglo-American philosophy. And, despite the word 'Cartesian' being a 'dirty word', Descartes and the tradition he inspires permeate western philosophy. For example, take the common metaphor often deployed in Philosophy regarding the mind. The computational metaphor often employed in philosophical and scientific literature simply does not sufficiently capture what we know about knowledge, persons, and the nature of reality. And, some trends in the literature are beginning to see this and, as a result there are growing trends to attribute credit where it is due, but that is still quite a minority report. Sorell summarizes the contribution of *Descartes Reinvented* when he says, "Philosophy ought of course to be informed by science, but some of its problems about mind and knowledge do not go away when scientific advances are made. 'Innocent Cartesianism' has a role in making this clear. It can sometimes consist of asserting the endurance of the old problems in the face of breezy declarations of an entirely new agenda." [4, p. ix]

Adding to the naturalist tendency toward computational or scientific explanations of persons is the tendency amongst 'anti-rationalists' away from the clean division of mind and body so common to Descartes and the Cartesians. One need not be committed, however, to both Cartesianism (or its basic ligaments) and all the items at home in Descartes that might be construed excesses of his thought to appreciate his legacy in contemporary analytic discussions. One excess that is commonly perceived in Descartes is that he is overly rational at the expense of emotion. This excess concerning the use of reason over emotion, arguably, is not readily attributable to Descartes or his system. Yet, what remains important is the real difference between mind and body that leads Descartes to a new science of which contemporary philosophers enamoured with the same reality of consciousness are on a similar quest. And,

this resonance or concentration is reminiscent of Descartes' spirit, which is a well-worn path pointing back to Descartes as we explore the relationship between consciousness and the natural world.

Helpfully, Sorell develops two types of Cartesian theses that aid in defending this well-worn Cartesian path and, at times (although the jury is still out and much discussion is still needed), may point to aspects of his legacy actually being true - or nearly so.

Sorell gives a term to Descartes' system what he calls 'Unreconstructed Cartesianism' or what you might think of as pure Cartesianism. A summary of his system can be surmised here: (1) there is a real distinction of the mind and its reasons, as mind-independent, and sense-based or perceptually based experience, yet these items representing the world may not be wholly accurate representations. These items can be doubted. (2) Cartesianism is ultimately a form of anti-scepticism, but scepticism is applied in a certain domain of inquiry and requires discrimination between some facts derived from sense-experience and those rationally determined. (3) All of Science (as Descartes had a broader conception of Science than what is contemporarily considered to be the 'scientific method', i.e. methodological naturalism) should be arrived at by using reason well and finding one's conclusions on premises that avoid falsity or error. (4) Fundamental metaphysical and epistemological knowledge is rooted in the first-person as being the most reliable or certain. This is most clear of Descartes in the *Meditations* [7]. (5) By way of the first-person perspective, Descartes establishes the actual distinctness of mind (or soul) and body as independent substances (of which the mind he is most certain), which exacerbates problems perceived by contemporaries concerning the interaction of two radically distinct substances. (6) Metaphysics depends first on the mind, as an immaterial thing, rather than Natural science. Pure Cartesianism, then, provides a more sure basis for arriving at better conclusions within the sciences. Arguably, this leads not to a pure empirical method, i.e. methodological naturalism, but rather methodological dualism or methodological pluralism.

In other words, Sorell develops 'unreconstructed Cartesianism' that takes seriously the mind, first-person knowledge, rationalism in Science, rational based virtue, the ineliminability of subjectivity in conversation with what he calls 'innocent Cartesianism'. Innocent Cartesianism in many ways resembles 'unreconstructed' but revises it to meet varying concerns in 20th and 21st century thought. At times, these do not depart from 'unreconstructed' and at other times they are revised or fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions are left obscure and unanswered for the sake of privileging some other agenda. He defines 'innocent Cartesianism' along these lines: "Innocent Cartesianism is the reinterpretation, and sometimes outright revision, of unreconstructed Cartesianism so as to meet some of the scruples of twentieth-and twenty-first century philosophy" [4, p. xiii]. Some features can be rejected or dismissed with a hand-wave, yet they cannot reject all aspects of unreconstructed Cartesianism. For example, the following features of Descartes' thought persist and continue to shape ongoing contemporary philosophical thought as we seek with

Descartes for a new science. The following features comprise what Sorell helpfully calls 'innocent Cartesianism', which leave much to be desired, namely: the nature of the cogito, a sure foundation for Science, and imply theism. Leaving the explanatory situation, resembling Descartes' legacy, without advantage beyond that of 'unreconstructed Cartesianism' with its strong substantial dualism and the singularity of God as a metaphysical principle founding all sensible objects.

3.1. Self-implicatedness and self-authority

Recent studies have recourse to Descartes' discussion about the nature of authority and the importance of the self as somehow implicated in the process of making claims concerning knowledge and action. Most notably Descartes argues in the *First Meditation* with its thought experiments about dreaming and the reliability for the authority of the first-person in contrast to sense experience of the environment. In the *Second Meditation*, Descartes argues for the over-reliance on sense experience as being, at times, an unreliable guide to truth and not fully trustworthy [7, vol. VIIA, p. 5-6]. He explores these themes in more depth in the *Discourse* and *Essays* [7, vol. VII, p. 20; 8]. Descartes commits to a 'pure enquiry' that reflects his rationalist sympathies and provides a frame for weeding out the simplistic notion of Aristotle's empiricism brand of naive realism that is later taken up by philosophers and scientists [5, p. 64]. For Descartes, senses are not completely reliable, and more, necessarily require conceptual import to understand what they signify [4, p. 3; 7, vol. VII, p. 3-6, 32; 8, vol. I, p. 81-82, 193-194].

Descartes' view of detachment from sense concerning their absolute nature is taken up, for example, by Thomas Nagel with his 'physical conception of objectivity' in *The View from Nowhere* [9]. These discussions, especially given self-referential authority as a starting point, have and continue to make their way into epistemological discussions as seen in Putnam's famous anti-realist stance that all of language and epistemic stances are language dependent [10]. Yet, as William Alston so carefully articulates, even Putnam's anti-realist stance is thinly veiled with a minimalist realism that presumes the 'I' that consumes the modern mind after Descartes [11]. The modern discussions retreat to a minimal self-reference that is never made more clear than by Descartes [12]. "They leave a Cartesian residue in the theory of self-reference. After discussing these uses, I return to the question of whether Cartesian certainty is primarily certainty about things in inner space. I shall claim that while Cartesian certainty is always connected to the conscious effect of a thought, the subject matter of that thought is hardly ever psychological, and the conscious effect of the thought is not sufficient for truth. What is crucial for truth is the connection between the conscious effect and the constitution of the mind in which the effect occurs." [4, p. 21, 33] This residue remains an enduring issue in contemporary Epistemology at the intersection of the mind's constitution. Making famous ongoing thought-experiments attributable in large part to Descartes' demon-deception, brain in

vats and other such experiments that permit ongoing scepticism of Descartes' purer thought (i.e. unreconstructed) and affirmations of part of it (i.e. innocent).

Sorell rightly concludes with this minimal Cartesian thesis: "The minimally Cartesian view that I am attracted to may coincide with Shoemaker's view, according to which self-reference depends on the existence of psychological predicates with the following defining characteristic: They can apply in a special way to subjects, such that, when they apply that way, the subjects cannot fail to know they do. 'Is in pain' is such a predicate. Shoemaker calls these P* predicates, and he thinks that these predicates are the sort that are self-ascribed in cases Wittgenstein calls uses of 'I' as subject: 'I see so-and so'; 'I am trying to lift my arm', and so on. Wittgensteinn contrasts uses of 'I' as subject with uses of 'I' as object, where a reference to one's body can take the place of 'I', as in 'I have grown six inches' or 'I can't get into these trousers'." [4, p. 29-30] I as an object is dependent on I as a subject. This, too, is a residue of Descartes and demands the attribution as the clarity of the proposition is known through reflection.

3.2. Foundationalism

The scepticism regarding Cartesian 'inner' perspective and the ineliminability of the 'I' as a reference in language, and, by implication, epistemology are both Cartesian in nature and finds there the clearest expressions in Descartes' system of the meditations (particularly what analytics call internalism found in the *First Meditation*) [4, p. 62-63; 7, vol. VI, p. 76, 141-142; 8, vol. I, p. 150, p. 103]. But many are not so sanguine about Descartes' system and wish to revise it in important ways. These furnish a sort of foundationalist epistemology seemingly held by Descartes, but quite out of fashion today [13]. With that said, these debates continue to oscillate around foundationalism and presume aspects of foundationalism or modify it in some way as philosophers struggle to make sense of sources of knowledge and grounding for knowledge. One of the central issues in contemporary Epistemology has surrounded the issue and extent to which beliefs are internal to the knower (i.e. internalism) or external to the knower (i.e. externalism) [4, p. 52-53]. Yet, the fact remains that while the content might derive its warrant from external circumstances, there is an 'ineliminable' component to knowledge that draws from the first-person perspective as knowledge that is justified or warranted for the *subject* of knowledge. This is presumed in Descartes and anticipated by him.

3.3. Ineliminability of cogito

The former two features that characterize much of analytic philosophy and modernity to contemporary times yields a belief about the nature of the cogito originally articulated in Descartes, especially in his *Meditations* and persists today as the philosophical foundation for contemporary epistemology

and yet, more so, the nature of the mind itself. The cogito - that 'I' think is something that we are, undoubtedly, psychologically certain about, has implications for the nature of persons in the philosophy of mind. This is where Descartes makes his most distinctive mark in contemporary Philosophy, arguably, and, as I will argue this carries over into the study of Neuroscience and, ultimately, in creative and thought-provoking ways in contemporary theistic philosophy projects. It is, first, an entailment from the unavoidability of self-reference, the implied self in language, and the necessity of the first-person perspective in Epistemology [4, p. 86-87; 8, vol. I, p. 139-140; 7, vol. VI, p. 55-59]. Now, not all accounts, as we have seen, give credence to Descartes nor do they share all aspects of what Descartes made so clear, but they resemble Descartes in important ways by sharing a commitment to the reality that *I* think, which has something to do with the character of what it means to be a *person*. More on this below.

3.4. Irreducibility of consciousness

There is a relatively recent trend in 20th century philosophy to affirm not the reducibility of consciousness to matter, but, instead, its irreducibility [4, p. 89; 8, p. 9-10; 7, vol. VII, p. 13-14]. This trend stands as one of the most fascinating features defining the developments in Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and points us to that which reflects Descartes' most important contribution. It is in the irreducibility of consciousness as seen in the first-person perspective that has become one of the most fascinating and lively areas of contemporary analytic philosophy to date and is reflected in a growing number of philosophers's rejection of various physicalist thesis of mind (otherwise called theories of the mind, TOM) from identity theory, reductive theories, and, finally, functionalist theories of the mind. The irreducibility of consciousness stands to reason as the feature foundational to who we are as persons that has prompted a move from these theories to the following: non-reductionism, versions of emergentism, neutral monism, and mysterianism (theories we will define in a moment) that come closer to Descartes than their purer materialist rivals. The difficulty with these theories is that they fail to account for the irreducibility of consciousness as a product of materialism. This unavoidable Cartesian character might point to the fact that Descartes was closer to the truth than his critics give him credit, but it also points to another Cartesian feature that has not been systematically highlighted in contemporary analytic philosophy let alone Theology, but is picked up in theistic philosophy. That is the character of the Divine and its role in Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology reflecting ongoing trends in contemporary Philosophy and Neuroscience as well as a rather underdeveloped area - namely, Theology.

3.5. The entailment of God

In addition to developments in philosophy of mind's trends toward the irreducibility of consciousness, which we will address, there are new developments in Neuroscience and Philosophy that owe their source and motivation to Descartes [4, p. 63; 7, vol. II, p. 141, 428; 8, vol. II, p. 101, 289]. While there is much to say, beyond what has been said already, about Descartes' 'new clothes' in contemporary developments in Epistemology, I will narrow my focus on developments in the philosophy of mind and its implications in Neuroscience and Theology. What we find here is an important dialectic occurring between the unavoidable cogito and the entailment to God.

4. Descartes' 'new clothes' I - Philosophy

This move is made by other philosophers reflecting on Science, and, notably, reflected in Cognitive science. Philosopher Thomas Nagel adopts the Cartesian stance (i.e. a kind of innocent Cartesianism), in some respects, on his reflection on the mind, the cogito, in *The Last Word* [14]. The rational nature of Science as necessary reflects the *cogito* that one can get outside of one's thoughts and assess empirical data with Logic, Ethics, Mathematics, values and the like. In fact, like Descartes, there is some recognition that these are, in fact, necessary epistemically and rooted in first metaphysical principles. These sorts of items are present in Science and they reflect the sort of Cartesian 'residue'. It is a rationalism, and feasible foundationalism, that is implicit in Science that presumes mind-body dualism - the unavoidable Cartesian item in Science.

Tom Sorell summarizes this rational and foundationalist character (resonating with Descartes) by commenting on Thomas Nagel: "Nagel has more trouble with the unity of reason, with the unity of subjectivism, and with the unity of rationalism than Descartes being clear about foundations. Although there is a kind off endorsement of Cartesian foundationalism in Nagel's refutation of subjectivism, I am not sure that it belongs to innocent Cartesianism." [4, p. 84] 'Innocent foundationalism' is the thesis holding to the irreducibility of consciousness as a fixture in the philosophy of mind. Interestingly, Nagel represents the trend, originally found in Descartes, toward a unified science resting on sure singular principles furnished by Metaphysics that makes mind central to the process. The Cartesian cogito character that is reflected in the features above is present in contemporary philosophies and Cognitive science and that is seen in Nagel to some degree.

Interestingly, since Sorell's writing, Thomas Nagel has come out more clearly in favour of some version of panpsychism which reflects a closer affinity to Descartes because of his views about constitution undergirding the irreducibility of consciousness [14]. There is more to say here about that in the context of practicing cognitive scientists and philosophers of Science, which I address below, but it is worth highlighting this development in Nagel's

philosophy of mind as principally coming out of his reflections on Science and the natural world.

Sorrel finds the 'residue' as present in some of the most important developments in 20th century philosophy of mind: Searle [15], McGinn [16], and Strawson [12]. All three philosophers reflect a trend in early philosophy of mind engaged with Cognitive science that recognizes the intractable nature of consciousness with Neuroscience. Searle adopts a non-reductionism that characterizes not 'innocent' Cartesianism but the unavoidable or eliminable Cartesian perspective that is present in all aspects of consciousness and is not directly quantifiable. McGinn opts for a mysterianism that he argues will never resolve the tension between the mind and body, but he is not committed to a kind of materialism on the surface. McGinn states: "My whole point has been that mind and brain form an indissoluble unity *at the level of objective reality*. In some way we don't understand, consciousness and the brain are intelligible aspects of the same thing, not the chalk and cheese they seem to be." [16]

McGinn commits not to physicalism of agent minds, but to a form of naturalism that entails neutral monism mysterianism. Yet, the problem with his mysterianism is that he posits a 'I Know-not-what' position that could as well fall under physicalism or dualism. The advantages of dualist mysterianism, minimally, is that it recognizes the distinctions between two sets of property-bearers and, ultimately, finds its unity in God. The problem is that McGinn would, at this point, commit to a view strikingly similar to Descartes' mind-body dualism. Uwe Meixner confirms this when he comments on McGinn, "Are there actual mental events that are nonphysical events? It seems to me, he will have to answer 'yes' to this question - or break radically with the impression he is making. Hence McGinn is a dualist (a mind-body event dualist, more precisely speaking)." [17]

Strawson, too, recognizes the tension between the two natures of the physical and the mental. Further, he is convinced that the properties of physical things do not describe the properties of mental things. All three, however, fail to offer characteristic solutions to the mind-body problem making Cartesianism, once again, a live option in the literature [4, p. 85]. These responses suggest something about Cartesianism - that not only is the view plausible but the ineliminability of the Cartesian cogito is alive and well. Furthermore, the route to 'mysterianism' found in McGinn parallels Cartesianism in that Cartesianism affirms a kind of mysterianism but not the kind of mystery reflected in its naturalist competitors (as with Searle, McGinn, and Strawson). Instead, it reduces the mystery to a mystery grounded in theism where we have an ultimate mind [4, p. 99]. The question for the philosopher, then, boils down to which position is a more coherent and a more satisfying option in the mind-body debates. But, for our purposes here, Descartes' residue is present in current discussions - despite what some might have us believe.

All three philosophers are in a similar place as Descartes in their affirmation of views concerning the irreducibility of consciousness and the reality of the first-person perspective. Mysterianism simply fails to offer a

ground and throws up the 'mystery' card. Neutral Monism is similar in that it posits a third sort of ontology undergirding both the material and the immaterial - something we know not what, which provides no explanatory advantage over 'unreconstructed Cartesianism'. Both affirm versions of mysterianism at the fundamental ontological level, yet both come close to Descartes in their positing scepticism in our empirical method and the unavoidability of an ontology of self-predication.

Panpsychism and Dual-Aspectism come even closer to Descartes. Panpsychism is the view that properties of a material type and a mental type exist at the fundamental ontological level. Minds either exist at a low level or mind-lets exist in potency. Dual-aspectism comes in varying forms and affirms that there exist two types of properties resident in the natural world. There is a way, then, to uphold the properties of consciousness as irreducible to the material with the preservation of I-concepts as predicable of *subjects* of consciousness. In other words, the challenge on dual-aspectism (as one version of property dualism) recoils to a mysterious explanation about what it is that grounds or instantiates the properties - something Descartes substance dualism aids in providing a solution.

Chalmers has famously called this the 'hard problem of consciousness' and one for which Physics and Biology will not have an answer [18]. For Chalmers, the phenomena exuded, as it were, may be studiable as information, but the ineliminable subjectivity and qualia - i.e. the Cartesian residue presents itself once again as a feature of the world non-reducible to natural physical entities and as a feature not observable through empirical means (at least not in the same way as physical things and not directly observable) [J. Weisberg, *The Hard Problem of Consciousness*, in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/].

Here we seem to be presented with a piece of common-sense and folk psychology that resists elimination, reduction, hand-wave, or ignoring probably because as Descartes makes so apparent, the reality of consciousness and its properties are ever present with us at differing levels of justification. They cannot be excised from our view of the world, or from Science.

And, while there has been an ongoing development amongst philosophers to affirm some sort of non-reductive physicalism that, at least, takes seriously the hard problem of consciousness, qualia (as distinct from quantitative data), and the first-person perspective (or 'subjective appearances' as Thomas Nagel calls it), it is not clear that they have solved much more than Descartes in terms of consciousness and its properties, nor that they can do so without some view akin to Cartesianism, hence 'innocent Cartesianism'. To the surprise of many, this dualistic character, explicitly branded by Descartes, finds its way into the recent neuroscientific literature. All pointing to one feature that seems to mount itself as compelling the Cartesian notion that consciousness is irreducible and finds a natural home in Descartes' substance dualism or, at a minimum, some sort of ontology that privileges the mind.

5. Descartes' 'new clothes' II - Neuroscience

Interestingly, despite the protestation to the contrary, many neuroscientists are haunted by the ghost of Descartes. The suggestion that Descartes did not have the scientific garb we have today points rather in the direction that he has new clothes, but few are willing to admit it. The nature of the irreducibility of consciousness, the ineliminability of the 'I', and the first-person perspective are features often discussed yet without reference to Descartes. But, if truth be told, he has just been redressed as the elephant stands in the room.

What we will find here, then, is a form of implicit 'innocent' Cartesianism. Philosopher of mind and Ethics, Daniel Robinson confirms this lasting legacy of Descartes in science and particularly, Neuroscience. Specifically, he has rung the sounding bell against the assumption that materialism fits better with Neuroscience despite a common belief to the contrary. The neuroscientists who think they know more about the mind as a material thing are mistaken. In fact, we can offer robust theories of the mental structure (on the sort of view given above) that the mind has dual-aspects (subjective and non-subjective) and one of those can find a coherent, neat, simple explanation for correlates between the two substances, but this in no way undergirds the materialist assumption. Furthermore, Robinson argues quite powerfully that these assumptions end up looking something like Descartes' problem. Neuroscientists may not posit two substances but they end up assuming something like Descartes that requires some explanation that fails to give materialists any explanatory edge.

Daniel Robinson highlights the Cartesian character in Neuroscience, which is the same problem present today as it was in Descartes' time [19, 20]. Daniel Robinson states: "The brain has no motives and seeks no solace. That actual persons - possessed of brains and other anatomical structuresv - are, indeed, motivated and do, indeed, strive to find deeper meaning in an otherwise indifferent cosmos is beyond dispute. That such motives and longings are somehow enabled by the brain should be readily granted but not as a fact that would give the motives and longings to the brain or locate them in the brain. Such inferences might well trigger activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in any creature expecting propositions to be meaningful." [19] Robinson's claim is clear that materialist scientists have no advantage over Descartes nor do they have good reason for rejecting the notion of a mental substance. The properties of consciousness do not obviously map on to the correlates found in neural events, even if the brain causally triggers states in the mind.

In fact, neuroscientists and philosophers who reject Cartesianism, as a ghost in the machine, do so in a way that bears little resemblance to Descartes. Robinson once again confirms this important point: "Rather, I hope to show that the 'Cartesianism' that confers leading-edge modernity on those who criticize and oppose it bears little relationship to what Descartes actually affirmed, and that what he did affirm is not radically different from what is widely endorsed by today's cognitive neuroscientists" [20]. Desmond Clarke agrees: "the problem

with which Descartes struggled in the 1640's it's not much closer to resolution today, despite significant advances in our understanding of the properties of matter" [20]. Both show that neuroscientists who try to avoid Cartesianism actually affirm something quite similar when they describe neural correlates of consciousness. I will show why this is the case in what follows.

It is not uncommon for neuroscientists, for the reasons previously seen, to reject dualism yet affirm 'internalism' as seen below by one famous representation yet also pointed out in the research of Manzotti and Moderato [21]. What this means is that consciousness is "physically located in the brain. So far, in the brain there is no empirical evidence of any phenomenon with the properties of phenomenal experience - namely intentionality, quality, unity, and the first-person perspective. From a conceptual perspective, since the physical world is devoid of the aforementioned properties and since the brain is part of the physical world, there cannot exist any such properties in the brain. To conceal the fundamentally different nature of consciousness from the brain, neuroscientists adopt an explanatory strategy that consists in presenting the mind as if it were in the brain. Mental properties are here but not like physical stuff. They are there, and they are not here. In other words, mental properties exist in x (refer to the body), but not like y (properties of material things)." [21, p. 90] "The problem of observing these mental properties strikingly reveals a veiled attempt to eschew the predication of properties through an elusive strategy." [21, p. 90]

5.1. Neuroscientism's strategy

The strategy effectively obfuscates the differences in the properties as a way of buying time. Manzotti and Moderato make this clear: "That strategy consists in adopting a confused terminology that makes use of ontological promissory notes such as code-talk, information-talk, computation-talk, and model-talk" [21, p. 90]. But there is a related problem. "That same strategy ends up concocting a form of dualism in disguise because neuroscientists have the logical form of dualism, but they don't want to pay the ontological price" of committing to that which is intuitive and explains the reality of the mind as a substance distinct from the physical [21, p. 90].

Internalism, as Manzotti and Moderato argue, is not implied by physicalism or by any empirical evidence. "Frankly speaking, the impression is that internalism's adoption and its inability to find any phenomenon akin to consciousness call back into service the ghost in the machine - albeit in disguise. Yet, this outcome runs afoul of the heralded rejection of dualism. This rather embarrassing situation resulted in entering into oddest relation with Ontology by ontological promissory notes that, so it is promised, will be paid back in the future." [21, p. 91] Interestingly, the authors have in mind a kind of metaphysical internist thesis, but there is something pervasive that reflects Descartes' epistemic internalism, which presumes metaphysical internalism. For Descartes' the self is implicated in the process and yields some authority to the

mental substance (i.e. subject of experience) that has private or privileged access to the properties of the mind - something which, at one level, is not directly observable in a third-person way as on neural maps. For this reason, the following question is easily answered: will it be paid back? It appears that it will not because the strategy actually defies the ontological commitments to physicalism and finds a natural home in Descartes' mind-body dualism.

The strategy, then, is clear. Physicalist neuroscientists of consciousness will claim that the mind is here where the brain and its neurons are, but obscure the nature of consciousness in the process, thereby leaving a Cartesian 'residue'. In fact, they fail to point out in any observable way how it could be identified with the brain and its parts. Furthermore, they will proceed in arguing that consciousness-properties are not like brain parts, particles, neurons and the like for they are epistemically different (and, it would seem to follow, irreducible to the brain parts interacting - a position originally in Descartes' writings and growing in popularity in the analytic literature). They are novel in a way that the neural events fail to capture. This amounts to language adoption that renders the dualism of mind and body ambiguous [21]. Furthermore, it provides an explanatory promise that down the road we will have an explanation. Finally, it is a disguised dualism that fails to take us any further than what we find in Descartes (assuming he failed in his substantial dualism) approach to providing a science of consciousness and the world.

There are two issues worth highlighting that reflect Descartes' heritage. The first is epistemic having to do with the nature of first-person beliefs, experiences, and knowledge. The type of knowledge we derive, i.e. third-person knowledge, from Neuroscience fails to map on or capture the nature of knowledge that is phenomenal in nature and affects both how we see the world yet also impacts reality by way of contributing some novel perspective on it. Furthermore, this reflects the ineliminable mind that was described earlier and yields a form of epistemic internalism. But, there is a further dialectical tension clearly brought out in contemporary discussions. It yields something metaphysical in character.

There is a tendency, as already suggested, to presume materialism amongst neuroscientists of consciousness. As explained already there is a tendency toward a different type of internalism - one that attributes consciousness and its properties to neurons, neural events, or holistic neural structures. Again, what some helpfully call metaphysical internalism because it makes claims on the nature of the mind and consciousness as somehow, albeit ambiguous, in the brain. Contrastively, this is not the position Descartes held, obviously, but it does strikingly resemble Descartes in that it not only presumes epistemic internalism, but also presumes something of the dualistic nature regnant in Descartes. The difference is that the materialist assumption of many neuroscientists obfuscates when talking about consciousness as being material yet clearly distinguishes it from what is observable concerning neurons firing themselves. Let the reader understand: this distinction is profoundly Cartesian, and may rightly be called 'Cartesian materialism' [21]. Taking one concrete

example in the neuroscientific literature on consciousness and the self, the well-known neuroscientist Shaun Gallagher falls into the trappings listed already and, in places, presumes a form of internalism and, arguably, Cartesian materialism.

5.2. Considering Shaun Gallagher and Kai Vogeley

Kai Vogeley and Shaun Gallagher offer us a concrete example of precisely the methodological strategy to avoid Descartes' problematic dualism. A summary of their argument is in order then. Vogeley and Gallagher discuss the merits of 'The Self in the Brain' and in it the dualism of Eccles and Popper (not far off from Descartes), and suggest that the terms being used are purportedly unclear leading down a dark alley to metaphysically murky places. They suggest that there is a better approach that maps on to 'science'. By arguing that we should begin with the data from Neuroscience on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC), they believe we can develop a language that closely maps the scientific process concerning consciousness. Again, as we saw earlier, they suggest that we adopt a language system in order to, arguably, handle the dualistic intuitions present when we describe conscious experiences as if they just are, ambiguously, neural correlates. They do so by arguing that we need to use the 'operationalization of key features' of self that map on to the Neurosciences and give us a place to come at, as it were, the conscious subject implicit in our discussions. They posit that there is a self-system in the brain and that we should use 'various definitions of first-person perspective', that are activated in different parts of the brain. By a simple operationalization under the rubric of 'narrative', we can make sense of conscious selves through a neuroscientific method. In this way, correlations are used and the self is methodologically operationalized, and linguistically interpreted. Several examples of this 'strategy' are readily available from Vogeley and Gallagher [22].

Emotional reactions of selves are part of the anterior cingulate cortex. They note some of the challenges by highlighting the fact that there is no common neural correlate for all experiences, which is suggestive of the fact that maybe there is more going on than what is found in the brain when considering the conscious self. The evaluation-network of the Self v. Non-self, they suggest, correlates with one of the following: the medial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus, the temporoparietal junction, or the temporal pole. It is true, as they show, that different self-specific acts correlate with different regions (e.g. deductive reasoning too the medial prefrontal cortex), but correlations do not amount to these rational activities or identify actual states of consciousness because of the rational synthetic process action done by minds in a way that requires first-person consciousness without which there would be no third-person way of making sense of neuronal patterns observed. More importantly, still, it is unlikely that all states of consciousness will have NCC

(i.e. neural correlates of consciousness) or that we would have the ability to map them [22, p. 115-130].

Interestingly, Vogeley and Gallagher argue that there is a way to map out the conscious self in neuroscientific terms. "The first-person perspective is relational or intentional insofar as having a first-person perspective on anything that relates that thing (some object in the world, another person, even the self-as-object) to the experiencing subject. Legrand and Ruby, (2009) thus suggest that this concept can be cashed out at a basic neurophysiological level, namely, the level of sensorimotor integrative processes involving efferent and reference. The fact that one can find activation in sensorimotor areas not only when none is perceiving and acting, but also in tasks related to language, emotion, and intersubjectivity, strengthens their suggestion." [22, p. 129] This strategy, however, seems to redress the problem of neuroscience using a strategy that confuses the issues rather than illuminating them.

A language acquisition is adopted that obfuscates rather than clarifies what is true of the Cartesian character present in our consciousness. This leads to a deeper issue with neuroscientific studies of consciousness that lend themselves to an adoption of Cartesian language (i.e. the Cartesian residue) in a way that fails to give credit where credit is due. Finally, it points us to something about Cartesianism that might suggest its truth - or something near it.

5.3. The unavoidability of Cartesianism

While wishing to be more scientific in their approach of the self and pushing against metaphysics not only do Vogeley and Gallagher *imply metaphysical positions* but they adopt a metaphysical system as the lens for interpreting Neuroscience. They conclude with a cautionary (and promissory) note using the warning from Daniel Dennett [23] to not look in the brain but to look at the self-in the world (commonly called an extended thesis that is inclusive of the brain and other externalist facts contributing to it). Ironically, they end on an ontological note that favours materialism despite their original professions to the contrary.

But this raises a question about the self and consciousness. *What's left of the self?* This seems to entail the eliminativist thesis, consistent with Daniel Dennet [23], but fails to articulate it honestly. Rather than articulate an argument that avoids the Cartesian character present in their analysis, they adopt a disguised Cartesianism.

There is another area in which Philosophy and Neuroscience fail to account for the origins of conscious selves, namely one that yields theism. Unsurprising to the student of Descartes in the history of Philosophy, Descartes represents a long tradition of viewing the soul as intimately related to and pointing to theism. One either presupposes the other or is entailed in some way by it. Descartes recognized this too and argued vigorously for it. While the domains of academic study are beholden to naturalistic attitudes and perspectives, they fail to account not only for consciousness but the origins of

consciousness (namely, theism). As is common to Descartes, there is a Cartesian feature that has motivated a novel set of theistic literature that highlights the fact of irreducible consciousness in the direction of theism, and, more, that shows us that reality is ultimately theological.

6. Descartes 'new clothes' III - theism

Descartes is a boogeymen in theological discussions. As Theology interacts more consciously with Science, there is, however, a startling discovery of Descartes' presence. Despite the portrayal that Descartes is the model of what not to believe in discourse on God, Divine action, and human nature, the proposed solutions get us no closer to explaining the enigma of consciousness's relation to the natural world, and even begin to parallel some of the features of Descartes (i.e. 'innocent' Cartesianism). The following then is limited in scope to briefly exploring the recent neuroscientific-engaged theological literature and surveying projects that lay out the cogito's theistic implications. These serve a foundation for additional research in the theological literature. For these reasons, there is a growing trend to reassess the irreducibility of consciousness, the ineliminable 'I' and their place in Theology. Some, even take this one step further, and like Descartes press for consciousness's theistic implications.

This area of study in Philosophy and Neuroscience impacts recent science-engaged theologies. In his helpful summary of theological anthropology and the Cognitive sciences, Aku Visala, writes: "Contemporary cognitive scientists typically reject the soul as metaphysically unnecessary. Instead, they refer to the mind, the self, and consciousness." [24] But as we have seen above, this language of mind, self, and consciousness is rightly what is a challenge for all physicalists, namely the irreducible nature of consciousness as a property of a substance (likely of an immaterial sort). Although Visala clearly recognizes that dualism has not been left out by the cognitive sciences: "Thus, contemporary dualists do not usually present their metaphysical account of persons as souls as competitors to Cognitive science, but simply maintain that Cognitive science leaves something out" [24, p. 65]. What Visala claims is true as far as it goes, but it is not clear that Neuroscience yields non-reductive physicalism or *mere* property dualism rather than substance dualism, given Cartesian-adjacent claims of the unavoidable cogito.

Less than fully satisfied with dualism (construed as substance dualism for short) yet wanting to bridge the gap between the tendencies perceived in Cognitive science and religious anthropology, Aku Visala readily admits that non-reductive physicalism is not entirely satisfying because it eschews some of the common-sense data regarding consciousness, so instead of opting for dualism outright as with Descartes, Visala opts for a more modest position that he and others perceive as being somehow less threatening to the sciences, or more congenial to them and the deeply embodied character of minds. This is an example of what was described earlier as 'innocent Cartesianism' or a view that comes close in its affirmation of basic features about consciousness and persons

without committing to Cartesianism. Some see this move as necessary when considering the deliverances of the sciences, but it is not clear why. Let's consider one famous theologian as an example of this trend.

For example, the famous Princeton theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen gives up dualism because he sees it as in tension with the sciences by making too strong a distinction between neural capacities and mental capacities that requires supernatural explanation (like the creation of persons by God) [24, p. 68]. Some will wonder why this is a concern, and rather see this as paving the way to a more congenial science at home with consciousness. The fact that God is an entailment or implication from our scientific study does not seem readily problematic, but instead opens the door to what some have seen as the obvious implications from Cartesian considerations. In fact, it seems that the data from Cognitive science is not clear on why one should reject dualism and it may, in fact, be that we simply need a reconfiguring of our scientific method that inverts our understanding of the mental/immaterial and the physical (and honestly takes account of the *a-priori* method - what one might call methodological dualism).

Despite this trend toward naturalistically oriented views of persons in theological anthropology, Descartes' stamp remains. The present discourse typically has recourse to Descartes as the one who sent us on a trajectory rooted in his conception of human persons. That much seems to be at the forefront of many science-engaged theologies in so far as they have some recourse to the categories of mind, action, God and Divine action. Furthermore, they continue to be confronted with the challenge of accounting for consciousness as a distinct irreducible reality.

Daniel Robinson presses these points in his usual charming, albeit sarcastic, way to argue that Descartes's isolation of that which is 'clear and distinct' as two criterion closely conjoined and explanatorily grounded in Divine action would ensure knowledge [20]. This quite foreign idea to modernity, at one level, has significant plausibility as Robinson argues. The 'clear and distinct' ideas that are not only implicit to the scientific determinations, but they are necessary to it. What Descartes in *The Meditations* does is ground these scientific principles in Divine action - to make it sure and certain. But, without these rational features of 'clear and distinct' ideas, scientists would not and could not progress in Science. These are first-person perspectival sources of knowledge, and, once again, they are unavoidably Cartesian in character in a way that is not translatable into third-person empirical terms (i.e. methodological dualism or methodological pluralism is required), but, more important, they may require theism or, at a minimum, find a hospitable context there.

Third-person terms are simply insufficient for capturing what it is that we find in the natural world. This move is present in a set of growing literature in Philosophy, Theology, and the Science and religion literature that deserves highlighting and spelling out. First, that the developing neuroscientific and cognitive scientific literature presumes the fundamental axiom of the cogito and the 'a-priori' method was foundational to the scientific process entailing the

necessity for the first-person perspective, which is distinct from what we know about the neural maps in our brains. This despite what many philosophers and some scientists would have you believe that we supposedly know about the mind, consciousness, and 'persons' from Science. What they suppose is not only a feature of the world that is not certain (applying as they must the Cartesian features above regarding clarity), but that they obscure what it is that they know with what they think they know.

Another feature that is close to Descartes' project is something more fundamental and at home with Theology, or supernaturalism as some will call it, because of the intimate and deeply personal relationship between the soul (taking the soul as basically synonymous with the mind, immaterial substance) and God. Second, and more provocatively, ultimately, there is a growing literature attributable to Descartes' influence, which is fundamental to Science and at its heart theological. But, this, obviously, changes the character of Science and the way most have been conditioned to think about it methodologically, epistemologically and metaphysically.

Nonetheless, the relationship of that which the empirical sciences often presume concerning the body and the brain just isn't understandable by itself and it fails to capture the mind. The unavoidable cogito becomes an unavoidable theological assumption, then, that is *natural* to Science. This guiding assumption needs to be brought back into the picture of Science by shining a light on obscurantist science and the miss-leading conflation of two aspects of the world that are undeniably related, interacting (as Descartes so clearly showed), but also steer a way toward a new science.

One of the beautiful aspects of Descartes' thinking deserving further exploration in constructive theology is that in keeping with his motive to stay close to the Tradition, he desired to maintain that Theology is ultimate, i.e. 'the Queen of the Sciences'. This is seen in several multi-faceted ways, yet it is particularly poignant in a growing literature often called theistic intentionalism or theistic dualism, which both comprise a new turn in Science - theistic science. [25].

The larger sense that Descartes gave to Science is important for showing the general connection between Science and theism that ultimately makes science theological. In an important historical exposition of Descartes on science, with its fundamental understanding of the irreducible natures of bodies and souls, qualities and quantities, Tom Sorell, in a couple of places, highlights Descartes's influence, but this does not become a theme that he develops. He summarizes Descartes' argument in the following: "A way of summarising what Descartes does with omnipotence is by saying that he invokes it to make sense of a single reality that contains a lot of different natures, and too unify contingent and necessary combinations of these natures. The different natures occupy a single reality that is, the product of God's will. Natures that need not exist together do too difference because God wills it - the same reason that necessary combinations exist." [4, p. 77] Not all will follow Descartes' voluntarist account of the different natures, but what is important is how later

contemporary projects either implicitly or explicitly follow Descartes in their theistic account of the different natures. Some ground the interactive natures in the Divine *will* to varying degrees and in different ways and others will follow an *intellectualist* approach that permits the relation to be one rooted in the nature of God.

Numerous developing works illustrate this growing need for what I will call theistic science (or, even, methodological dualism) rooted in a conception of God and soul. The relationship established between God and soul may be one of inference, or a product of our faculties reliably functioning so as to produce belief in both God and soul, or something like a rational a-priori truth. So, not all contemporary thinkers reflect the same logical moves found in Descartes' *Meditations*, but what they do reflects a similar trend exemplified by Descartes that requires a re-visioning of Science with theism and the soul as foundational items in both the metaphysics and epistemology of Science. Rather than construe Science as naturalistic, i.e. as fundamentally concerned with the study of the objects of Physics (whether present or final physics), there is a trend to move from first-person truths and the properties of souls to God as paradigmatic for approaching all disciplines, including Science. This paradigm furnishes a ground for Science [26]. And while there exist ongoing reactions to this sort of project, it carries along Descartes' heritage. It is this heritage that deserves ongoing reflection from historical philosophers and theologians [27].

7. Conclusions

Upon tracing the developments in the history of analytic philosophy, there are some noticeable trends that should point us back to Descartes' influence within the history of Philosophy. There is a striking similarity to the very same problem of reconciling materialist philosophy with the uniqueness of properties of mental things. This is something noteworthy in Descartes' time and the same problem persists in the early 1900's into contemporary analytic discussions. The solutions advanced by some of the most influential figures in analytic philosophy end up affirming central features of Descartes' notion of the mental (e.g. the ineliminable I, the irreducibility of consciousness, the first-person perspective), yet these solutions fail to advance beyond Descartes' substantial dualism. Descartes' mark is significant here and it is reflected in trends that we find in Neuroscience and theistic philosophy.

While many would readily say Descartes is the emperor with no clothes, I have argued that he is more like the emperor with new clothes. Even more, when it comes to some of the fascinating developments in consciousness studies, Descartes is to intellectual history what the Wizard is to the green curtain in the Wizard of Oz. Whether mainstream academics recognize it or not, they should.

Acknowledgement

A special thank you to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for providing funding to write this article under the program called Humboldt Experienced Researcher Fellowship.

References

[1] H.C. Andersen, *The Emperor Has New Clothes*, Clarion Books, New York, 2004.
[2] G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, ix-23.
[3] J. Tanney, *Gilbert Ryle*, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford University, Stanford, 2022, online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/ryle/.
[4] T. Sorell, *Descartes Reinvented*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
[5] W.H. Walsh, *Metaphysics*, Routledge, New York, 2019, 97.
[6] D. Skrbina, *Dualism, Dual-Aspectism, and the Mind*, in *Contemporary Dualism*, A. Lavazza & H. Robinson (eds.), Routledge Press, London, 2014, 222-223.
[7] C. Adam and P. Tannery, *Descartes' Works*, vol. VI, Vrin/CNRS, Paris, 1967, 32.
[8] J. Cottingham, M. Stoothoff and A. Kenny, *The Philosophical Writings*, vol. IV, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 109-152.
[9] T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, 14.
[10] H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, 1-21.
[11] W. Alston, *A Realist Conception of Truth*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996, 132-162.
[12] P. Strawson, *The First Person - and others*, in *Self-Knowledge*, Q. Casasam (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, 210-215.
[13] T. McGrew, *The Foundations of Knowledge*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lexington, 1995, 1-174.
[14] T. Nagel, *The Last Word*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
[15] J. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, A Bradford Book, New York, 1992.
[16] C. McGinn, *The Mysterious Flame*, Basic Books, New York, 1999, 230.
[17] U. Meixner, *Two Sides of Being: A Re-assessment of Psycho-Physical Being*, Mentis, Paderborn, 2004, 245.
[18] D. Chalmers, *Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness*, in *Explaining Consciousness. The Hard Problem*, J. Shear (ed.), MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997, 18-19.
[19] D.N. Robinson, *Theological Anthropology and the Brain Sciences*, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology*, Routledge, New York, 2015, 79.
[20] D.N. Robinson, *Consciousness and Mental Life*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, 62.
[21] R. Manicotti and P. Moderato, *Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise*, in *Contemporary Dualism*, A. Lavazza & H. Robinson (eds.), Routledge, New York, 2016, 81-98.
[22] K. Vogeley and S. Gallagher, *Self in Brain*, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, 111-136.
[23] D. Dennett, *The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity*, in *Self and Consciousness*, F.S. Kessel, P.M. Cole &D.L. Johnson (eds.), Lawrencees Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1992, 103-115.

[24] A. Visala, *Theological Anthropology and the Cognitive Sciences*, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology*, J.R. Farris & C. Taliaferro (eds.), Routledge, New York, 2017, 57-73.
[25] C. Taliaferro, *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, 1-360.
[26] J.R. Farris, Philosophia Christi, **16(1)** (2014) 37-55.
[27] C. Insole, Mod. Theol., **17(4)** (2001) 475-83.